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A POSITIVE THEORY OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
By Eugene Kontorovich
ABSTRACT
Academic discussions of universal jurisdiction (“UJ”) have been almost 
entirely normative, focusing on what UJ “should” be in an ideal world. This 
Article breaks with the normative approach and analyzes UJ from a positive 
perspective, drawing on historical evidence and rational choice models to 
understand what UJ has in fact been and what it can be.
Piracy was for centuries the only UJ offense. This Article begins by 
isolating the characteristics of piracy that made it uniquely suitable for UJ. While 
these characteristics show why UJ over piracy would cause fewer problems than 
UJ over other crimes, they still fail to explain why nations would actually exercise 
UJ. The rational choice model of state behavior reveals that they would not. All 
that UJ adds to conventional bases of jurisdiction is the ability of unaffected 
nations to prosecute. Given that prosecution is costly, rational, self-interested 
states would not expend scarce resources to punish crimes that did not directly 
harm them. Nations using UJ would receive none of the benefits of enforcement, 
while bearing all the costs. UJ is a public good, and thus it would be provided at 
suboptimally low levels, if at all. Standard discussions of UJ entirely ignore the 
incentives faced by nations. When these incentives are taken into account, it 
appears that UJ cannot succeed in increasing enforcement or deterrence. 
Yet the rational choice prediction appears inconsistent with the fact that 
piracy was for centuries treated as universally cognizable. This Article presents a 
new explanation of the function served by the universal principle. This 
explanation reconciles the historic evidence and the major cases with the rational 
choice model. Universal jurisdiction over piracy was useful to nations as a legal 
fiction rather than as a real expansion of jurisdiction. It was an evidentiary rule, 
a presumption designed to facilitate the proof of traditional territorial or national 
jurisdiction in cases where such jurisdiction probably existed but would be 
difficult to prove. 
Modern efforts to broaden UJ invoke piracy as a precedent and a model. 
However, the new universal jurisdiction represents an entirely different 
phenomenon, one that does not share the characteristics that were necessary to 
piracy becoming universally cognizable, and that does not accord with the 
incentives of self-interested states. Thus the positive account of UJ suggests that 
the current efforts to expand it to human rights offenses will not succeed.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article develops a positive account of the nature and limits of 
universal jurisdiction (“UJ”). Unlike previous discussions, this Article explains 
UJ in a way that is consistent with the historic evidence, major cases, and with the 
incentives of rational, self-interested states. Modern universal jurisdiction over 
human rights offenses is still a new and tentative development. In international 
law, a nation’s jurisdiction is based on and congruent with the scope of its 
sovereignty: states have jurisdiction over crimes within their territory (territorial 
jurisdiction), or committed by or against their nationals (nationality and passive 
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personality jurisdiction).1 Universal jurisdiction is an exception to sovereignty-
based, or Westphalian, jurisdiction. If a crime is subject to universal jurisdiction, 
any nation can prosecute the offenders, even if there is no connection at all 
between prosecuting state and the crime.2 Before the end of the Cold War, there 
was not a single prosecution of human rights offenses that depended on the 
universal principle. In recent years this has changed, and now several national 
courts and international tribunals exercise or claim the right to exercise 
jurisdiction over offenses such as war crimes, genocide and torture under the 
universal principle. T he new universal jurisdiction (“NUJ”) is also among the 
most controversial developments in international law because it limits or qualifies 
nations’ jurisdictional sovereignt y.
However, at least since the 18th century, piracy has been firmly established 
as a universal offense. It remains the oldest and least controversial offense subject 
to universal jurisdiction.3 Proponents of expanding universal jurisdiction to 
human rights offenses have always claimed piracy UJ as a precedent or model for 
1 See Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow 
Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L. J. 183, 188-89 (2004) (explaining the different categories of 
jurisdiction in international law). This Article will refer to all of these traditional bases of 
jurisdiction as “traditional,” “sovereignty-based,” or “Westphalian” jurisdiction; these terms are 
used synonymously.  
2 See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 371 (E.D. La. 1997) (“Where a state 
has universal jurisdiction, it may punish conduct although the state has no links of territoriality or 
nationality with the offender or victim.” (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW § 404 cmt. a (1987))); Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. Chi. 
Legal F. 323, 323–24 (2001) (describing universal jurisdiction as jurisdiction with no “nexus 
between the regulating nation and the conduct, offender, or victim”).
3 See Kontorovich, supra note 1, at 190; Michael P. Scharf, The ICC’s Jurisdiction Over the 
Nationals of Non-Party States: A Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 
80-81 (2001) (“The first widely accepted crime of universal jurisdiction was piracy. For more than 
three centuries, states have exercised jurisdiction over piratical acts on the high seas, even when 
neither the pirates nor their victims were nationals of the prosecuting state.”).
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their broader vision of UJ.4 Given the well established nature of piracy UJ and the 
still controversial and unsettled status of NUJ, one would expect international law 
scholars to have a keen interest in understanding why piracy was subject to UJ and
why this enjoyed universal acceptance, an acceptance that NUJ has yet to win.5
Answers to these questions could help provide a more solid foundation for NUJ, 
while also suggesting its limitations. However, international law scholars have 
failed to explore what it was about piracy that made it universally cognizable. 
Instead, beginning with the assumption that piracy and modern UJ are creatures of 
the same species, scholars have, generally with little explanation or analysis, put 
forth anachronistic explanations for piracy UJ. As a result, these accounts can say 
little about what kinds of universal jurisdiction would work in practice, or about 
what kinds of offenses can be subjected to such jurisdiction without causing 
conflict among nations, unfairness to defendants, or failure to improve deterrence.
4 See Kontorovich, supra note 1, at 184-85 & nn.10-16, 203 & nn.117-18 (explaining the 
importance of the “piracy analogy” to modern universal jurisdiction and citing cases and 
commentary analogizing new universal offenses to piracy). As Judge Michael Kirby of the 
Australian Supreme Court put it recently: 
[T]here are precedents that would encourage a common-law judge to uphold 
universal jurisdiction. Courts of the common-law tradition have done so in the 
past in relation to pirates . . . Such people were . . . the perpetrators .  .  . of grave 
crimes against mankind. To this extent the notion of universal jurisdiction is not 
entirely novel or extralegal. What is new is the expansion of crimes to which 
universal jurisdiction is said to apply.
Michael Kirby, Universal Jurisdiction and Judicial Reluctance: A New “Fourteen Points,” in 
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES 240, 
258 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004); Hari M. Osofsky, Note, Domesticating International Criminal 
Law: Bringing Human Rights Violators to Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 191, 194 (1997) (“Piracy served 
as . . . the progenitor of some of the later jurisdictional expansions.”).
5
 Throughout this Article, UJ will be used as shorthand for the general principle of universal 
jurisdiction. To distinguish between universal jurisdiction as it existed for hundreds of years – a 
jurisdictional exception unique to piracy – and the modern universal jurisdiction that concerns 
itself primarily with human rights violations, this Article will refer to the latter as “modern 
universal jurisdiction,” “new universal jurisdiction” or “NUJ,” and the former as traditional or 
piracy UJ. See Kontorovich, supra note 1, at 184 n.9 (introducing the term “new universal 
jurisdiction” and explaining its relation to the “new customary international law” that began to 
develop after the Second World War).
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This Article pursues an alternative to abstract grappling with the nature of 
universal jurisdiction. It identifies and explores the characteristics that made 
piracy a universal offense. By doing so, this Article in effect identifies what have 
long been the necessary conditions for universal jurisdiction itself – because until 
recently piracy has been the only universal offense. In developing a positive 
understanding of what made piracy suitable for UJ, a deeper set of questions 
arises, questions that have also been neglected by scholars.
While the unique characteristics of piracy explain why UJ over it would 
result in fewer problems than UJ over other offenses, this does not explain why 
nations would ever exercise UJ in the first place. Unlike the normative and 
optimistic treatments of UJ, a positive account must show why exercising UJ 
would be consistent with the incentives faced by self-interested and rational 
sovereign states. A nation exercising UJ expends scarce resources to punish 
crimes that have not injured it; thus it bears all the costs of enforcement while the 
benefits are enjoyed primarily by other nations. Indeed, universal jurisdiction over 
piracy was honored more on paper than in practice. According to the leading 
scholar of piracy law, there were almost no piracy prosecutions that could not 
have been sustained on traditional, sovereignty-based theories of jurisdiction such 
as territoriality or nationality.6 Thus a positive account of UJ would ideally 
explain why it was confined to piracy, and why it was affirmed by courts and 
commentators for centuries, yet almost never put into practice.
6 See ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 348 n.50 (2d ed. 1998) (concluding that universal 
jurisdiction over piracy has been applied “very few times,” and enumerating fewer than five cases 
in the past 300 years). See also Kontorovich, supra note 1, at 192.
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There is, to be sure, an existing account of piracy’s jurisdictional status, 
but it lacks any historical basis. In the dominant view, piracy was universally 
cognizable because of its extraordinary heinousness.7 This account is convenient 
for proponents of NUJ, because the current roster of UJ offenses – genocide, war 
crimes, torture and so forth – are expressly selected based on their heinousness. 
Thus if UJ over piracy was also based on heinousness, it would provide a 
venerable and solid precedent for the emergent NUJ offenses.8 Modern scholars 
start at the end and try to reason backwards to the beginning. They begin with 
what they normatively believe should be the proper model of universal 
jurisdiction – the heinousness of the offense.9 Defining UJ in relation to 
7 See Kontorovich, supra note 1, at 205-06 (“The modern argument for universal jurisdiction sees 
the historic treatment of piracy as evidence of an exception to standard jurisdictional limitations 
based on the “outrageousness” or “heinousness” of the crime.”). See also id. at 205-06 nn.125-28, 
130-32 (citing cases and commentary asserting that the substantive heinousness of the conduct is 
the common rationale for universal jurisdiction from piracy onwards). See, e.g., Scharf, supra note 
3, at 80-81 (“Many of the crimes subject to the universality principle are so heinous in scope and 
degree that they offend the interest of all humanity, and any state may, as humanity’s agent, 
punish the offender. . . .Piracy’s fundamental nature and consequences explained why it was 
subject to universal jurisdiction. Piracy often consists of heinous acts of violence or depredation.”)
(emphasis added).
8 See Kontorovich, supra note 1, at 208. See, e.g., Christopher C. Joyner, Arresting Impunity: The 
Case for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War Criminals to Accountability, 59 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 166-67 (1996) (arguing that piracy provides a precedent under which war 
crimes and similar human rights offenses should also be universally cognizable because “[s]uch 
crimes are far more serious than piracy or slave trading, the oldest offenses subjected to universal 
jurisdiction”).
9 See, e.g., Leila Nadya Sadat, Redefining Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 241, 244 
(2001) (arguing that human rights offenses are universally cognizable because they are “so 
heinous”); Joyner, supra note 8, at 164-65 (explaining that the “universality principle . . .holds that 
some crimes are so universally abhorrent . . . that jurisdiction may be based solely on securing 
custody of the perpetrator”). Cf. Anthony Sammons, The “Under-Theorization” of Universal 
Jurisdiction: Implications for Legitimacy on Trials of War Criminals By National Courts, 21 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 111, 127 (2003) (“Many commentators and jurists incorrectly seek to 
divorce the assertion of universal jurisdiction from principles of states sovereignty. They assert 
that the basis of universal jurisdiction arises from the ‘heinous’ nature of the crime itself.”).
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heinousness, they then attempt to shoehorn piracy UJ into that model.10 However, 
the model does not fit the historical facts.11
In a previous article, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal 
Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, in the current issue of the Harvard 
International Law Journal, I disproved this influential but fundamentally 
anachronistic explanation of piracy’s jurisdictional status.12 The Piracy Analogy 
demonstrates that piracy was not subject to UJ because of the substantive 
heinousness of the piratical conduct.13 The previous article was negative: it 
showed that the dominant explanation for universal jurisdiction simply did not fit 
the facts. But that conclusion raises an obvious question – if not heinousness, then 
what can explain piracy’s special jurisdictional status?
10 See, e.g., Joyner, supra note 8, at 165 n.48 (“Piratical acts were made subject to universal 
jurisdiction . . . because they were considered particularly heinous and wicked acts of violence and 
depredation.”); Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. 
REV. 785, 794 (1988) (arguing that the “rationale” for universal jurisdiction over piracy was that 
the “fundamental nature” of the offense consisted of “particularly heinous and wicked acts”).  
11 See generally, Kontorovich, supra note 1.
12 Id.
13 See generally Kontorovich, supra note 1.  The full proof cannot be reprised here, but the basic 
outlines can be sketched. First, the exact same behavior engaged in by pirates was perfectly legal, 
and certainly not universally cognizable, when committed with sovereign authorization – the letter 
of marque issued to privateers. Id. Privateers were simply licensed pirates, yet all maritime nations 
issued licenses authorizing the former to attack and plunder civilian shipping, and respected the 
licenses issued by other nations. Id. By contrast, heinousness as understood by NUJ refers to 
conduct that is so horrible that its character could not be mitigated by sovereign authorization; 
indeed the prototypical NUJ offenses of war crimes and genocide presuppose such authorization. 
Id. Second, The Piracy Analogy shows that piracy was a form of robbery and understood to be not 
significantly more heinous than robbery in general; in other words, it was regarded as culpable 
conduct but was not regarded among the most reprehensible crimes. Id. Finally, the previous 
article demonstrates that the historical evidence adduced to show that piracy was subject to UJ 
because of its heinousness does not actually support this proposition.
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This Article picks up where the previous one left off. It develops a positive 
account of what did motivate piracy UJ.14 While the heinousness-based “piracy 
analogy” is invalid, piracy cannot help but inform modern discussions of 
universal jurisdiction. The jurisdictional approach that many wish to extend to 
major human rights violations was created in the specific context of piracy. Thus 
the characteristics of piracy are a natural place to start in understanding the nature 
and limits of universal jurisdiction. Moreover, piracy UJ was by the standards of 
international law an outstanding success -- universally accepted, of long service, 
and generally uncontroversial. Discussions of UJ usually begin with an ideal 
vision, and then may stoop to discuss the practical problems. This Article 
proceeds in the other direction. It examines the one historically successful 
instance of universal jurisdiction to determine the necessary ingredients. Then it 
can be determined what current international problems share those characteristics. 
This approach requires admitting, from the beginning, that it is by no means 
certain that the rationale for piracy UJ would justify a NUJ of the scope that some
wish for it, if any. But the theory of UJ that emerges from this study will stand on 
a sounder basis, and stronger though it may be narrower. 
Part I begins by identifying six characteristics of piracy that explain why it 
was singled out for universal jurisdiction. Piracy was committed by private actors, 
not public officials. Moreover, pirates were a subset of private actors particularly 
who had intentionally foregone the protection of sovereign states, since all nations 
were willing to authorize piratical conduct in exchange for a share of the proceeds 
14 The positive task is more uncertain than the negative one; it is harder to explain the causes of a 
historical practice than to demonstrate that a purported explanation is erroneous. 
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through the practice known as privateering. Of all actors, pirates were particularly 
unlikely to have the solicitude of their home states. Second, piracy took place on 
the high seas. This did not render traditional jurisdictional concepts moot, as 
commentators often mistakenly assert. It did however make enforcement 
particularly difficult. Third, by preying on maritime commerce, which was 
implicated the economic interests of many states, pirates were likely to affect
many nations; not in the sense of an abstract injury to their moral sensibilities, but 
in the sense of actual and tangible injury to their ships, nationals or trade. Fourth, 
piracy was recognized as wrongful and criminal (but not heinous) by all nations. 
Fifth, all nations prescribed the same punishment for the offense. This is crucial 
because under UJ, the prosecution by one nation acts as a double jeopardy bar to 
subsequent prosecution of the same offense, and thus disparities in punishment 
would result in forum shopping, unequal sentencing, and conflict among nations 
angered by what they perceived as overly lenient or overly harsh sentences for an 
offense that is within their common jurisdiction. Finally, piracy was a narrowly 
defined offense and there was general agreement as to its elements. Piracy subject 
to UJ was not simply crime on the high seas, it was forcible robbery on the high 
seas. Thus UJ over piracy would have relatively little opportunity to expand to 
other offenses or be applied outside its intended scope for political reasons.
Part II describes a deeper puzzle facing positive accounts of universal 
jurisdiction: why would rational, self-interested states ever prosecute crimes under 
the universal principle? All that UJ adds to traditional bases of jurisdiction is the 
ability of nations without any stake in the matter to prosecute. Yet UJ has no 
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positive theory to explain why a nation would incur the costs of enforcement 
when other nations would gain the immediate benefits. Expanding jurisdictional
possibilities to nations with no stake in the matter should be expected to have no 
effect on enforcement or deterrence. A second enforcement paradox is that by 
allowing all nations to prosecute, UJ could be expected to create a collective 
action/free rider problem among nations where none would have the incentive to 
be the first to prosecute. Indeed, the history of piracy shows these paradoxes are 
not merely theoretical constructs. While nations repeatedly asserted the existence 
of UJ over that offense, they nearly never exercised it. 
Part III presents a new positive explanation of the function of universal 
jurisdiction that is consistent with the piracy experience. It also shows why UJ 
was a useful concept despite the paradoxes described in Part II and despite the 
lack of actual UJ prosecutions. When UJ concepts were powerfully invoked in 
piracy cases, it was not to expand the frontiers of jurisdiction. Instead, the concept 
was used as an evidentiary rule to facilitate the proof of jurisdiction in cases 
where the forum state had substantial connection to the offense but this 
connection could not be established in court because of some unique 
characteristics of piratical conduct. Part IV concludes by considering the 
implications of this positive account of UJ for modern attempts to expand UJ to 
new offenses.  
I. THE NECESSARY CHARACTERISTICS OF UNIVERSAL CRIME
This Part identifies and explores the significance of the characteristics of 
piracy that made it the only universal offense. Commentators have noticed the 
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importance of some of these characteristics, such as locus delecti, in explaining
universal jurisdiction over piracy. Other important characteristics, like the 
uniformity of punishment meted out to pirates by various nations, have been 
overlooked. Moreover, no one has looked simultaneously at all of the defining 
characteristics of piracy relevant to its universal status. Many of these 
characteristics have been misunderstood or oversimplified by contemporary 
courts and scholars. Thus the commentators who stress the multinational nature of 
the piratical threat and its occurrence where nations cannot easily police against it
ignore the salient fact that only private actors could be pirates; conversely, those 
who stress the oft-misunderstood private action requirement ignore the 
importance of location or other factors. 
Understanding all of the relevant characteristics is crucial to appreciating 
the limited scope of the piracy universal jurisdiction. For in the case of piracy, all 
these factors coincided. There were numerous offenses that bore some of these 
traits, but none was subject to universal jurisdiction. Most of these characteristics 
were necessary to piracy’s universal status, and the others helpful. Thus these 
characteristics in effect describe the limits of UJ itself as it was created and 
practiced for centuries.
A. Private actors who eschewed state protection.
Piracy consisted of purely private, non-governmental action. Pirates were 
by definition private parties: the exact same conduct that constituted piracy was 
perfectly legal when authorized by a sovereign state. From the 17th through early 
nineteenth centuries, all maritime states issued licenses, called letters of marque 
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and reprisal or writs of marque which authorized the bearer to attack and seize 
civilian ships on the high seas.15 The bearer of such a commission was not only 
outside the universal jurisdiction that applied to pirates, he was immunized from 
punishment.16
The limitation of UJ to those commerce-raiders who acted purely on 
private initiative serves two interrelated ends. First, as a positive matter, it lessens
the chances that UJ will lead to hostilities between nations. Indicting a foreign 
official will be perceived as a grave insult by the government of the nation, and an 
interference with its self-government.17 Indeed, it can set the stage for war --
consider the U.S. invasion of Panama to arrest its president, Manuel Noriega, for 
trial in American courts. Second, official conduct is political conduct. Keeping 
political conduct outside the scope of UJ reduces the opportunities for UJ itself to 
become a tool of international politics,18 and keeps judges focused on their 
traditional task of righting retail wrongs rather than matters bearing closely on 
foreign policy.
15 ANGUS KONSTAM, PRIVATEERS AND PIRATES, 1730–1830, 3 (2001) (describing privateering as 
“a form of nationally sponsored piracy”).
16 See DAVID CORDINGLY, UNDER THE BLACK FLAG: THE ROMANCE AND THE REALITY OF LIFE 
AMONG THE PIRATES, at xvii-xviii (1995).
17
 For example, the Spanish indictment and request for extradition of Gen. Augustus Pinochet, a 
senator and former dictator of Chile, strained relations between Santiago and Madrid and London. 
See Regina v. Bartle, 1 A.C. 61, 89 (H.L. 2000).  Lord Lloyd explained:
[o]n 3 November 1998 the Chilean Senate adopted a formal protest against the 
manner in which the Spanish courts had violated the sovereignty of Chile by 
asserting extra-territorial jurisdiction. They resolved also to protest that the 
British Government had disregarded Senator Pinochet’s immunity from 
jurisdiction as a former head of state.
Id.
18
 The limitation of UJ to private actors does not entirely purge the question of political 
considerations because private parties can act with political ends. During civil wars, insurrections 
and secession, the question of whether someone is a private actor can require, or at least imply, 
judgments about political legitimacy. See Kontorovich, supra note 1, at 222.
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Some commentators have noted that the new universal offenses, such as 
war crimes and genocide, invariably involve state action, whereas piracy never 
did.19 As a result, critics of universal jurisdiction over human rights offenses 
argue that piracy cannot provide a  precedent for most assertions of NUJ, and is 
particularly inapposite to the contentious question of universal jurisdiction over 
heads of state.20 David Rivkin and Lee Casey point out in a recent article that 
modern multilateral treaties authorizing UJ – the only examples of UJ that clearly 
enjoy genuine and broad state consent – only apply to aircraft hijacking and 
related offenses, which are carried out by private actors.21
However, while it is true that pirates were private actors and thus clearly 
distinguishable from most potential NUJ defendants, this still does not explain 
why nations would allow for UJ over pirates. A state is likely to have some 
interest in the fortunes of its citizens, not just its officials, and thus it is not 
obvious why UJ over private parties would not also be objectionable. Countries
often object when their nationals are prosecuted by the states where or against 
whom they committed their crimes; it could be even more obnoxious if, as with 
UJ, the prosecuting state has not even been injured by the defendant.
19 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 236 (5th ed. 1998) (“The 
essential feature of the definition [of piracy] is that the acts must be committed for private ends.”).
20 See Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin, Jr., The Limits of Legitimacy: The Rome Statute’s Unlawful 
Application to Non-State Parties, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 63, 75 & n.25 (2004)  (“There was no state responsibility 
implicated by pirate offenses.”); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, IV, The Current Illegitimacy of 
International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 361 n.230 (1997) (observing that 19th
century piracy jurisdiction “cannot be invoked as a basis to construe the original understanding of the [Alien 
Tort Statute] to extend to the acts of a foreign sovereign and its agents committed on foreign soil in violation”
of international law).
21 See Casey & Rivkin, supra note 20, at 75 n.25
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On closer examination, pirates were well suited for UJ because they were 
not simply private parties. Rather, they were private parties who often acted 
against the interest of their home state and who had intentionally waived their 
home state’s protection. To understand this, one must recall that piracy existed 
side-by-side with privateering. Pirates engaged in the exact same conduct as 
privateers – seizing civilian ships and cargoes by force.22 Both drew their crews 
from a common labor pool, and many privateers, chafing at the restrictions 
imposed on them, “turned” pirates. And sometimes pirates could be induced to 
“go straight” and become licensed privateers.
The sole difference between the two types of sea-robbery was that the 
privateer obtained a license to capture prizes, while the pirate did not bother with 
licensing. Obtaining a writ of marque was notoriously easy – it was not a 
licensing system that requir ed any demonstration of nautical prowess or moral 
probity.23 Obtaining a writ of marque had two principal consequences. First, the 
writ limited the bearer to preying on ships of hostile nations. Neutral shipping was 
generally out of bounds. States that issued writs of marque wanted to channel 
commerce-raiding to where they regarded it most useful. At the same time, they 
did not want their nationals to embroil them in disputes and potential hostilities 
with neutral nations. Ironically, the ban on piracy and the concomitant acceptance 
of privateering sought to avoid precisely the kind of thing that a broad UJ would 
allow –confrontations between sovereign states.
22 See Kontorovich, supra note 1, at 214-16.
23 See id. at 211-12 (describing procedures for securing a writ of marque).
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The other major provision of letters of marque required privateers to split 
the proceeds of their captures – typically ten percent – with the sovereign that 
authorized them.24 Pirates were those commerce-raiders who refused to share 
their earnings with any government. Since they were engaged in the same 
business as privateers, they competed for prizes with them. Every prize taken by 
pirates reduced potential revenues for the licensing state. Pirates acted against the 
interests of their home state. Thus they could expect little succor from it. 
Universal jurisdiction was not confined merely to private as opposed to 
public sea-raiders. Privateers, though not subject to universal jurisdiction, were, as 
their name suggests, very much private parties seeking their private fortunes.
Privateers were no more state actors than a restaurant owner with a restaurant 
license is a state actor. Rather, UJ was limited to the subset of private actors who 
had distanced themselves from their home states to an extent that one would not 
expect the home state to feel a proprietary interest in their fate.
This limitation explains the legal fiction of statelessness famously 
articulated by Blackstone25 and subsequently by Chief Justice Marshall in United 
States v. Klintock.26 In a case decided two years earlier, Marshall had held that the 
federal piracy statute27 did not apply to piracies by foreigners against foreigners, 
despite the statute’s “any person” language.28 Marshall recognized that such 
24 See id. at 214.
25
  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 71 (Chicago 1879) 
(1769) (explaining that pirates were universally punishable because they “renounced all the 
benefits of society and government”).
26
 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144 (1820).
27 Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 36, § 8.
28 See United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 633-34 (1818).  Marshall wrote:
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universal jurisdiction could result in judicial interference with other nations’ 
sovereign prerogatives.29 In Klintock, Marshall appended an odd qualification to 
the recent holding: while Congress did not intend the statute to apply to crimes 
against foreign nationals by foreign nationals, it does apply to piracies by those 
who are not nationals of any state.30 The certificate of the Court upheld the 
indictment of the pirate at bar because they had “throw[n] off their national 
character by cruising piratically.”31
Marshall’s entire discussion of statelessness appears unnecessary because 
Klintock was, as the Attorney General stressed, a citizen of the United States.32
One needs no special jurisdictional theory to allow a nation to punish its citizens 
for crimes committed abroad. It is not clear why Marshall did not simply look to 
Klintock’s citizenship. It may be because in the previous case, Palmer, he 
supported his notion that Congress did not intend to create universal jurisdiction 
[t]he court is of opinion that the crime of robbery, committed by a person on the 
high seas, on board of any ship or vessel belonging exclusively to subjects of a 
foreign state, on persons within a vessel belonging exclusively to subjects of a 
foreign state, is not a piracy within the true intent and meaning of the act. 
Id.  Quite unnecessarily, Marshall opined in unsupported dicta that Congress could have chosen to 
punish foreigners for piracies against foreigners, under the universal jurisdiction principle. Id. at 
630 (“[T]here can be no doubt of the right of the legislature to enact laws punishing pirates, 
although they may be foreigners, and may have committed no particular offence against the 
United States.”). However, he interpreted the statute on the assumption that Congress had not 
intended to authorize universal jurisdiction.  Id.
29 Id. at 632-33.
30
 Klintock, 18 U.S. at 152.  Speaking for the Court, Marshall opined:
[w]e think that the general words of the act of Congress applying to all persons 
whatsoever, though they ought not to be so construed as to extend to persons 
under the acknowledged authority of a foreign State, ought to be so construed as 
to comprehend those who acknowledge the authority of no State.
Id.
31 Id. at 153.
32 Id. at 143, 147.
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with the statute’s title, “an act for the punishment of certain crimes against the 
United States.”33 Klintock had seized a Danish vessel,34 and so the victim’s 
nationality would not provide for jurisdiction under Marshall’s somewhat forced 
reading of the piracy statute. Thus to sustain jurisdiction over the crime 
committed by a U.S. national, the Chief Justice shoe-horned the prosecution of a 
U.S. national into the universal theory by arguing that the defendant was in fact 
stateless, and the statute authorize UJ over stateless (but not foreign) defendants.
The statelessness criterion is obviously a fiction, though one that continues 
to confuse accounts of the reasons for universal jurisdiction over piracy.35 There 
is nothing magical about piracy that destroys its perpetrators’ national connection. 
Modern piracy law is more positivist, recognizing that whether a pirate “throws 
off his national character” is a matter for his home state to decide.36 This is 
consistent with the facts of Klintock, where the high court of the home state, the 
U.S., deemed him stateless, though it may with the same effect have treated him 
as an American national. Marshall’s holding that universal jurisdiction could only 
extend to those who “acknowledge the authority of no state” is simply a shorthand 
33
 Palmer, 16 U.S. at 631 (emphasis added).
34
 Klintock, 18 U.S. at 145.
35 See, e.g, United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 105 (2003) (stating that “States and legal 
scholars have acknowledged for at least 500 years” that piracy is a universal offense in part 
“because the crime occurs statelessly on the high seas”).
36
 Geneva Convention on the Law of the High Seas, April 25, 1958, art. 18, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (“A 
ship or aircraft may retain its nationality, although it has become a pirate ship or aircraft. The 
retention or loss of nationality is determined by the law of the state from which such nationality 
was derived.”). Under current U.S. law, a ship is treated as stateless only if the registering nation 
disclaims it (which can be done by not “affirmatively and unequivocally” confirming the ship’s 
registry when queried by U.S. officials) or if the ship’s captain does not claim national affiliation 
verbally or through adherence to formalities–the ship’s activities do not affect its nationality.  46 
U.S.C. app. § 1903 (c)(2) (2003) (defining “vessel without nationality” for purposes of the 
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act).
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for the idea that UJ can only extend to those who rejected the licensing scheme of 
their home states and the protection it carried with it. Thus the home state would 
be expected to reciprocally refuse to protect them. Prosecutions of such offenders 
will probably not cause friction with the foreign state, unlike prosecutions of its 
officials, its nationals acting under color of its law, or its nationals acting in 
violation of its laws but still of concern to their home state. The lack of solicitude 
from the pirates’ home state was considered a characteristic of piracy by 
contemporary jurists. As Justice Story put it, pirates were “not under the 
acknowledged authority, or deriving protection from the flag or commission of 
any government.”37 Yet in another purported piracy case, when the offender’s 
home state did object to U.S. courts’ assertion of jurisdiction over its nationals,
Story yielded to the foreign interest and refused to exercise jurisdiction.38
B. Locus delecti makes enforcement difficult.
Many modern discussions stress the importance of the locus delecti in 
establishing universal jurisdiction over piracy.39 While the locus is very important 
to piracy’s UJ status, commentators misunderstand its significance. Some have
suggested that because no state has jurisdiction over international waters, piracy 
occurs where traditional notions of jurisdiction do not apply. Without universal 
jurisdiction, the argument goes, there would be no jurisdiction at all.40 The flaw in 
37
 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 163(1820) (emphasis added).
38 United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832 (C.C. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551).
39 See, .e.g., Scharf, supra note 3, at 80-81.
40
 These mistakes may also be attributable to an uncritical repetition of past legal fictions. See, 
e.g., supra, note 35, and accompanying text; LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: 
INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL PERSPECTIVES 58 (2003) (“[T]he locus delicti and the private 
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this account is that piracy did not occur so much on the high seas as on ships 
sailing the high seas. Ships were considered within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the nation where they were registered; they were floating outposts of that nation’s 
territory.41 Those ships that fell victim to pirates were almost always within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the nation whose flag they flew.42 Moreover, the victims 
of piracy came from somewhere, and thus were nationals of some state. 
Traditional jurisdictional concepts were adequate to deal with piracy without 
having to resort to universality.
The real problem was not the formal jurisdictional status of the high seas 
but the practical problem of enforcement.43 There was almost no governmental 
control over the seas and no “on the spot” enforcement system, as there would be 
act(or) requirement [] explain why universal jurisdiction over piracy is undisputed. Such 
jurisdiction cannot possibly infringe on another state’s sovereignty.”). Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
Defining the Limits: Universal Jurisdiction and National Courts, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: 
NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES, supra note 4, at 168, 169 
(observing that the occurrence of piracy on the high seas made it “very difficult to exercise 
jurisdiction based on territoriality or nationality”); Sammons, supra note 9, at 126 (“[N]ations 
predicated their formulation of universal jurisdiction over piracy on the notion that the crime 
usually was committed in terra nullius, such as on the high seas where no nation exercised 
territorial control.”); Joyner, supra note 8, at 165 n.48 (“Piratical acts were made subject to 
universal jurisdiction . . . because those acts occurred on the high seas, beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction.”); Osofsky, supra note 4, at 194 & n.18 (“[T]he peculiar character of piracy 
probably accounted for its internationalization as a crime; pirates committed offenses on the high 
seas, which were not within the jurisdiction of any country.”); see also Universality – Piracy, 20 
AM. J. INT’L. L. 563, 566 (1926) (“[T]he competence is better justified at the present time upon 
the grounds that the punishable acts are committed on the high seas . . . where no State has 
territorial jurisdiction.”). 
41 See S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10; OLIVER SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 250–52 (1991).
42 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The History of Universal Jurisdiction, in DEFINING THE LIMITS: 
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AND NATIONAL COURTS, supra note 4, at 47 (explaining that “early 
modern thinking about piracy was not linked to universal jurisdiction,” but rather to views such as 
Grotius’ that “ships on the high seas were an extension of the flag state’s territoriality” and thus, 
the flag state – and the flag state only – should be able to punish non-nationals for piracy against 
national ships).
43 See Slaughter, supra note 40, at 169 (“The principle of universality . . . is the way in which 
international law has responded to the pragmatic difficulties . . . of prosecuting offenses 
recognized as illegal in domestic legal systems around the world.”).
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for crimes within the body of a nation.44 Because of the vastness of seas, pirates 
could easily commit their crimes undetected. Moreover, the open seas made 
escape easy and apprehension difficult.45 The numerous largely uninhabited 
islands of the Caribbean, replete with unmapped coves and harbors, afforded 
perfect hideouts for pirates in between cruises. The difficulty of enforcement was 
stressed by Adam Smith in explaining why piracy, unlike ordinary robbery, is a 
capital offense.46
The enforcement difficulties should not be overstated. The high seas are 
vast, but not as vast as one might think – merchant ships generally traveled in 
known sea-lanes defined by wind and tide, and pirates would be found there,
too.47 To be sure, maintaining a navy was among the most expensive activities a 
nation could engage in; the high cost of arming ships, and the need to employ 
them against foreign navies, made piracy perhaps the most expensive of crimes to 
police. But nations could and did police against piracy with their warships. During 
outbreaks of piracy they would sometimes dispatch vessels with specific 
instructions to hunt down the offenders.48
44 Willard B. Cowles, Universality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes, 33 CAL. L. REV. 177, 193-94 
(1945).
45 See Scharf, supra note 3, at 81 (“[P]irates can quickly flee across the seas, making pursuit by the 
authorities of particular victim states difficult.”); Osofsky, supra note 4, at 194 n.18  (“If the 
nation owning the ship were the only one that could assume jurisdiction, pirates could easily 
escape capture and prosecution by boarding ships far from their home ports and keeping them 
beyond the reach of the home navies.”).
46 See ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 131 (Oxford 1978) (1762) (observing that 
piracy “requires a severe punishment” because of the “great opportunities there are of committing 
it”). 
47 See CORDINGLY, supra note 16, at 88-89.
48 See Violet Barbour, Privateers and Pirates of the West Indies, 16 AM. HIST. REV. 529 (1911).
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Given that piracy’s occurrence on the high seas made enforcement so 
expensive, how would universal jurisdiction – which merely allows nations to 
punish conduct that had not injured them – make the piracy problem any more 
tractable? The same paradox has been observed with regards to today’s universal 
jurisdiction. The extension of the universal principle to war crimes and genocide 
is motivated at least partly by the difficulty of preventing such conduct.49 But 
precisely because stopping such atrocities is expensive and risky, the extension of 
universal jurisdiction to these offenses has done next to nothing to encourage 
nations unharmed by the conduct to intervene.50
This suggests that the locus factor is more complicated than previously 
thought. The high seas locus was certainly crucial to piracy’s universal 
cognizability. The same conduct occurring on land would be robbery, and not 
subject to universal jurisdiction. (But while necessary, the high seas locus is far 
from sufficient for universal jurisdiction: murder or any other offense was not 
universally cognizable even when committed on the high seas.51) Yet the 
conventional explanation for the importance of the high seas locus raises more 
49 See Cowles, supra note 44, at 194 (observing that “war crimes are very similar to piratical acts” 
in that there is no on-the-spot judicial system to punish it, and arguing that war crimes should thus 
also be universally cognizable).
50 See Jack L. Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 
93 (2003) (observing that international war crimes tribunals have little effect). Goldsmith explains 
that:
[n]ations do not lightly expend national blood and treasure to stop human rights 
abuses in other nations. The Europeans were unwilling and unable to do so in 
the Balkans for years. . . . The brute fact is that despite hundreds of thousands of 
deaths caused by human rights abuses during the past decade . . . no wellspring 
of support for intervention has developed in the industrialized democracies that 
posses the military muscle to intervene and stop the abuses.
Id.
51 See United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 197-99 (1820).
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questions than it resolves, because the central feature of this explanation –high 
enforcement costs – suggests that making piracy subject to UJ would do nothing 
to encourage states to actually use universal jurisdiction. Part II will explore this 
paradox further, and Part III will suggests a new account of the function served by 
UJ, an account that makes sense of why the high seas locus was necessary. 
C. Threatens or harms many nations.
Piracy imperiled international commerce and navigation,52 which many
states had an interest in protecting. Some commentators see this as the crucial 
characteristic of piracy that made it universally cognizable.53 Universal 
jurisdiction over crimes that harm many nations would be easier for sovereign 
states to accept than UJ over crimes that primarily injure one nation. This is 
because in the latter case, the affected nation may have a very strong interest in 
dealing with the matter. Thus it would particularly resent assertions of UJ by 
nations that can claim no injury at all.
But while UJ over local or internal crimes may be more problematic than 
UJ over crimes that affect many nations, this does not explain why affecting many 
nations justifies truly universal jurisdiction. States do not have an interest in the 
safety of commerce and navigation in general; they have an interest in the safety 
of their own commerce and navigation. And if a particular nation’s ship has been 
52 See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 105 (2003) (observing that piracy has long been 
subject to UJ in part “because of the threat that piracy poses to orderly transport and commerce 
between nations”); Sammons, supra note 9, at 126 (“[P]irates launched attacks . . . against the 
vessels and citizens of many nations”.).
53 See Sammons, supra note 9, at 126 (“The transnational aspect of piracy is the most significant 
factor in justifying the exercise of universal jurisdiction over it.”); Universality – Piracy, supra 
note 40, at 566 (suggesting that “all [states] have an interest in the safety of commerce”).
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assaulted by pirates, that nation would have territorial jurisdiction over the 
offense. Moreover, to the extent that piracy did ramify broadly, the harm to 
individual nations would not be uniform. Nations have significantly different 
stakes in the prosecution and suppression of piracy. A nation would be threatened
by piracy roughly in proportion to its share of international shipping.54
Because piracy hurts some states more than others, one would expect a 
corresponding disparity in nations’ willingness to prosecute piracy regardless of 
the applicable jurisdictional theory. Indeed, because enforcement was expensive, 
it was almost always done for parochial rather than universal ends: Britain would 
dispatch ships to hunt down pirates that preyed on British ships, or pirates of 
British nationality who, by attacking neutral vessels had complicated the Crown’s 
foreign relations. Britain was not in the habit of “humanitarian” anti-piracy 
expeditions: it did not dispatch ships to hunt down pirates against the French.
As with the related characteristic of locus delecti, the current account of 
why multinational injury is an argument for UJ is unsatisfactory. Yet the 
importance of the international harm aspect should not be dismissed out of hand, 
because it was the characteristic of piracy that contemporary courts and 
commentators most often pointed to when explaining its unique status. The harm 
to many nations mattered; the question is why and how much. Part III will show
that the international character of piracy did make UJ a useful concept, but not in 
the way commentators have assumed.
54 Cf. Kirby, supra note 4, at 250 (“The international crime of piracy may be easy to justify as a 
crime of universal jurisdiction in a maritime, trading country such as the United States or 
Australia. But it may be less easy in other parts of the world.”).
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D. Uniform condemnation.
Piracy was not universally cognizable because of its heinousness. Indeed, 
it was not regarded as particularly heinous, at least in the sense that today’s UJ 
crimes like genocide and torture are considered heinous. Piracy was regarded as 
roughly on par with aggravated robbery in terms of culpability or enormity.55
However, the broad condemnation of piracy was not irrelevant to its universal 
status. Piracy was certainly regarded as wrongful by every (civilized) nation. 
There was no uncertainty over whether piratical conduct should be punishable. As 
well as being a crime under the law of nations, it was also a crime under the 
municipal laws of every nation. This was obviously necessary to piracy’s 
undisputed status as a universal offense, though it clearly would not be a 
sufficient condition – countless offenses were crimes in all countries, from murder 
to coining, but no other was universally cognizable.56
The importance of universal agreement as to wrongfulness is obvious. 
Firstly, there can be no universal consensus to make an offense universally 
punishable if there is not even universal agreement that it should be parochially 
punishable. If there is disagreement among nations as to whether conduct 
constitutes any kind of offense, then an exercise of universal jurisdiction over that 
conduct would be regarded as an encroachment on another nation’s legislative 
55 See Kontorovich, supra note 1, at 223-26.
56 See Yousef, 327 F.3d at 105 (“The historical restriction of universal jurisdiction to piracy, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity demonstrates that universal jurisdiction arises under 
customary international law only where crimes . . . are universally condemned by the community 
of nations.”).
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sovereignty – jurisdiction to prescribe, and not just jurisdiction to punish. It would 
give UJ prosecutions an inevitable political element.
E. Uniform punishment and double jeopardy.
A related but less obvious aspect of piracy that facilitated universal 
jurisdiction is that all nations criminalized piracy and all provided for the exact 
same punishment for the offense – death.57 The uniformity of punishment for the 
offense reduces the possibility that prosecutions under universal jurisdiction 
would result in one nation substituting its judgment about proper punishment over 
another’s. If Britain had some interest in prosecuting pirates that attacked their 
ships, but the United States seized them first, Britain would not have to worry that 
U.S. courts would let them off easy. The problem becomes more acute because 
the first nation to prosecute will be the only nation to prosecute. (This could be 
simply because it imprisons or executes the defendant, precluding subsequent
prosecution.)
Attempts to apply universal jurisdiction to human rights offenses have 
been plagued by problems arising from different tribunals imposing different 
punishments for the same crime. For example, the Rwandan government 
originally acquiesced to an international court sitting in Sierra Leone exercising
universal jurisdiction over the Rwandan genocidaires. The International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, however, does not impose capital punishment. Rwandan 
courts, on the other hand, routinely imposed the death penalty for the same 
offense. So when the ICTR takes jurisdiction over a defendant, it saves him from 
57 See SMITH, supra note 46, at 181.
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the death penalty, the punishment which Rwanda thinks appropriate to the crime. 
This creates obvious opportunities for forum shopping by defendants.58 Indeed, 
the worst offenders turned themselves in to the international tribunal, sparing 
themselves the death penalty, while lower-level perpetrators were executed.59 The 
disparity in punishment infuriated the Rwandan government, leading it to break
off its relations with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and actively 
interfere with its operations. Similarly, the ICTY statute sought to track the 
sentencing practices of the former Yugoslavia, but the Tribunal abandoned this 
approach when it became clear it would require imposing the death penalty.60
Different approaches to punishment will continue to pose serious 
problems for NUJ. European nations are the most vigorous proponents of 
expanding universal jurisdiction to heinous human rights offenses, but at the same 
time are adamantly opposed to the death penalty. By contrast, while the U.S. 
opposes universal jurisdiction for such crimes, it certainly does not oppose the 
death penalty. Even setting aside the question of capital punishment, there is little 
international consensus about appropriate penalties for the severe human rights 
offenses of NUJ. For example, the ICTY has thus far only imposed a life sentence 
on a single defendant, though the conduct for which others have been convicted 
58 See Brent Wible, “De-Jeopardizing Justice”: Domestic Prosecutions for International Crimes 
and the Need for Transnational Convergence, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 265, 274 (2002) 
(commenting that “a system where a defendant could face the death penalty in one jurisdiction and 
life imprisonment in another . . . would seem arbitrary and undermine the notion of universality”).
59 See id. at 274 & n.44.
60 See id. at 273-74.
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would certainly have resulted in multiple life sentences under, say, the U.S. 
approach to punishment.61
But more importantly, under universal jurisdiction, double jeopardy 
concepts prevent multiple prosecutions of the same underlying conduct. If there 
are variations between the penalties provided for by different nations, then the
first nation to prosecute determines the penalties. This amplifies the importance of 
uniform punishment for universal offenses. In international law, the double 
jeopardy concept is known by the civil law term non bis in idem.62 Put simply, 
subsequent prosecutions of a defendant for a given universal offense by other 
nations or tribunals would be precluded as surely as multiple prosecutions of the 
same conduct by a single state.63 The possibility that ineffective or lenient 
universal jurisdiction prosecutions will operate as a double jeopardy bar will 
make nations reluctant to subscribe to UJ principles, especially nations that favor
more stringent punishment.64
61 See Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Founder of Death Camps in Bosnia is Jailed for Life, DAILY 
TELEGRAPH, August 1, 2003, at 18. Of the remaining 25 defendants before the ICTY who have 
received final sentences, only two have been sentenced to terms in excess of 20 years, and ten 
have been given terms of ten years or less. See The ICTY at a Glance, at 
http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm (last visited March 22, 2004).
62
 The term literally means “not twice for the same.” See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1665 (7th
ed., 1999).
63
 The Princeton Principles agree that a nation’s “good faith” exercise of universal jurisdiction 
should be recognized as final and binding on all subsequent nations. See THE PRINCETON 
PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 23 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2001), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/~lapa/unive_jur.pdf. [hereinafter PRINCETON PRINCIPLES] (Principle 9). 
However, several participants in the project “questioned whether the prohibition on double 
jeopardy . . . was a recognized principle of international law.” Id. at 34, available at
http://www.princeton.edu/~lapa/unive_jur.pdf.
64 See, e.g., Caroline D. Krass, Bringing the Perpetrators of Rape in the Balkans to Justice: Time 
for an International Criminal Court, 22 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 317, 357-58 & n.266 (1994) 
(“The United States is concerned that the court will develop an unacceptable interpretation of 
crimes and that risk of double jeopardy problems will preclude national courts from prosecuting 
individuals acquitted by a politicized international court.”) (citing a 1991 letter from Janet G. 
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Crucially, non bis in idem only bars subsequent prosecutions of universal 
crimes – it is thus a significant exception to the standard practice regarding prior 
foreign prosecution. This is because most nations adhere to some version of what 
the United States Supreme Court calls the “the multiple sovereignties principle.” 
If a single act violates the laws of multiple nations and each nation has 
jurisdiction over the offender, each nation can prosecute in sequence – double 
jeopardy does not bar subsequent prosecutions.65 Violating the laws of each 
sovereign is a separate offence.
U.S. courts have consistently held that the United States can prosecute 
defendants for conduct that has resulted in foreign convictions.66 Such multiple 
prosecutions do not violate the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy clause – the 
defendant is not being put in jeopardy twice for violating the same law, but 
merely being prosecuted for all the laws broken by a given conduct.67 As the 
Supreme Court has observed, the multiple sovereignties doctrine is most 
important when there is considerable variation between the penalties the different 
Mullins, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, Department of State, to Vice President Dan 
Quayle).
65 See Dax Eric Lopez, Note, Not Twice for the Same: How the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine is Used 
to Circumvent Non Bis In Dem, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1263, 1272-73 (2000) (describing 
variety of state practices with regard to international double jeopardy and concluding that while 
some countries “afford foreign criminal judgments the same legal effect they do to domestic 
criminal judgments,” other states adhere to a multiple sovereignties approach and there is no 
“general consensus among nations” on the matter).
66 See id. at 1279-81 (citing federal cases allowing for prosecution of defendants previously 
convicted in foreign nations). While the Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, and district courts 
elsewhere, have consistently applied the multiple sovereignties principle to foreign prosecutions, 
the Supreme Court has only addressed the issue in the federal-state context. See id. at 1279 n.118. 
The multiple sovereignties doctrine has frequent application within the United States, where the 
federal government can prosecute a defendant based on the same conduct that has already resulted 
in state charges, and vice versa. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1920).
67 Id. at 382.
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sovereigns provide for the offense. If the states provide for smaller punishments 
than the federal government, “the race of offenders to the courts of that state to 
plead guilty and secure immunity from federal prosecution for such acts would 
not make for respect for the federal statute or for its deterrent effect.”68
The reasoning behind the multiple sovereignties principle has no 
application in universal jurisdiction (which is in any case an exception to 
sovereignty). Under universal jurisdiction, states exercise a single shared 
jurisdiction. While conduct constituting a universal offense can be tried by any 
nation, it is not because it comes within the sovereign prerogatives of each nation. 
Rather it is because UJ treats “the community of nations . . . as a juristic 
community.”69 Each nation’s courts act as agents for the world.70 Thus a second 
nation prosecuting the same offense would be just like a second U.S. district court 
prosecuting a crime already adjudicated in another district court. It is not 
surprising that the ban on international double jeopardy has long been recognized
as a consequence of universal jurisdiction. In United States v. Furlong, Justice 
Johnson described the bar on multiple prosecutions as a defining feature of 
universal jurisdiction over piracy: 
Robbery on the seas is considered as an offence within the criminal 
jurisdiction of all nations. It is against all, and punished by all; and 
there can be no doubt that the plea of autre fois acquit would be 
68 Id. at 385.
69
 Quincy Wright, War Criminals, 39 AM. J. INT’L. L. 257, 282 (1945).
70 See Joyner, supra note 8, at 165 (arguing that the “only basis” for exercising universal 
jurisdiction is “the assumption that the prosecuting state is acting on behalf of all states”); Wright,
supra note 69, at 280 (arguing that 19th century courts exercising UJ over pirates were acting as 
agents of the world community).
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good in any civilized State, though resting on a prosecution 
instituted in the Courts of any other civilized State.71
Further confirmation of the view that nations prosecuting piracy as a 
universal offense do not act as sovereigns asserting their several jurisdiction but 
rather as agents of the international order can be found in some British extradition 
cases – which also suggest the abuses that could result from treating crimes as 
within a single universal jurisdiction. Questions of international double jeopardy 
often arise in extradition proceedings because many treaties prohibit extradition 
for crimes already prosecuted in the sending country. In In re Tivan, Britain 
arrested American pirates but refused to extradite them. The relevant treaty 
required rendering of defendants belonging to “each nation’s jurisdiction.” The 
British courts upheld the refusal to extradite. Since piracy was a universal offense, 
the pirates were not particularly with America’s jurisdiction. The treaty meant 
only parochial U.S. jurisdiction and not “the jurisdiction which the whole world 
shares with them.”72 Similarly, Attorney-General v. Kwok-A-Sing involved a 
Chinese pirate who attacked French shipping in international waters and fled to 
Hong Kong.73 China requested his extradition under a treaty that allowed 
rendition of those who had committed “any crime or offence against the laws of 
China.” The Council held that “if he is punishable by the law of China, it is only 
71
 18 U.S. 184, 197 (1820). Justice Johnson’s statement in Furlong remains the leading authority 
for the principle, at least in the United States. However, like most judicial pronouncements on 
universal jurisdiction over piracy, this one was dicta of the grossest sort. Furlong did not involve 
piracy; thus it did not present the issue of universal jurisdiction, let alone the implications of such 
jurisdiction for successive prosecutions by different sovereigns.
72 In re Tivnan, 5 Eng. Rep. 645 (Q.B. 1864) (Crompton, J.) (“Is this a piracy within the words of the 
statute? It is to be within the jurisdiction of the United States; but does that mean within the jurisdiction 
which the whole world shares with them.”) (quoted in In re Stupp, 23 F. Cas. 281, 291-92 (C.C.N.Y. 
1873) (No. 13,562)).
73
 5 L.R.- P.C. 179 (Q.B. 1873) (emphasis added).
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because he committed an act of piracy which . . . is justiciable everywhere,” and 
the treaty did not contemplate extradition in such circumstances.74
Thus non bis in idem, a correlate of UJ, is a limitation on the normal 
prerogatives of states to prosecute conduct that violates their laws even if it has 
already been prosecuted elsewhere. One would expect such a limitation of 
sovereignty to apply only in situations where there is little reason to worry that it 
would put nations at odds with each other. Thus the uniformity of punishment for 
piracy facilitated its universal cognizability by reducing the likelihood that a 
prosecution by one state would have different consequences than the prosecution 
by another.
F. Well-defined offense.
Without universal agreement about the defining elements of a universal 
offense, UJ would easily and often provoke conflicts between nations.75 Unless 
the offense is precisely defined, it would be easy for nations to exercise UJ 
illegitimately, or for a nation to object to another’s exercise of UJ on the grounds 
that the conduct in question is not within the proper scope of the offense. Like any 
other customary international law norm, UJ requires that all nations consent to it, 
74 Id. at 200 (emphasis added).
75 Cf. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 106 (2003) (holding that terrorism is not subject to UJ 
because “[u]nlike those offenses supporting universal jurisdiction under customary international 
law–that is, piracy, war crimes, and crimes against humanity–that now have fairly precise 
definitions . . . ‘terrorism’ is a term as loosely deployed as it is powerfully charged”.) (emphasis 
added); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir.1984) (Edwards, J., 
concurring) (arguing that “the nations of the world are so divisively split on the legitimacy of such 
[terrorist] aggression as to make it impossible to pinpoint an area of harmony or consensus”); Id.
at 806-07 (Bork, J., concurring) (arguing that acceptability of terrorism is a question as to which 
there is “little or no consensus and in which the disagreements concern politically sensitive 
issues”) (emphasis added).
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and the more precise the norm the easier to determine whether nations have 
actually assented to it. A precise and universally agreed-upon definition makes it 
harder for UJ to be asserted for political ends. Many of the human rights offenses 
suggested for universal jurisdiction have very vague and indeterminate contours.76
This has lead some critics to argue against nations consenting to a jurisdiction that 
would be administered according to the political inclinations of the prosecutors 
and judges.77
In the same vein, the Second Circuit recently rejected the contention that 
UJ applies to international terrorism because there is no precise or neutral 
definition of the crime. As a positive matter, “one man’s terrorist is another man’s 
freedom fighter.”78 Of course there are sound, narrow definitions of terrorism, 
such as violence committed by irregular combatants against civilian populations 
to change the policy of a government. The Second Circuit’s point was not that 
terrorism could not be narrowly defined, but that no precise definition has won 
general acceptance.
76 See Kirby, supra note 4, at 250 (suggesting that judges should be cautious about accepting 
universal jurisdiction because “the crimes propounded may be ill-defined”); Leila Nadya Sadat & 
S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J.
381, 426-27 (2002) (“Defining crimes against humanity presented one of the most difficult 
challenges at Rome, for no accepted definition existed, either as a matter of treaty or customary 
international law. Indeed, of the several definitions that have been ‘promulgated,’ no two are 
alike.”).
77 See E.V. Kontorovich, The ICC – Open and Shut, JERUSALEM POST, May 10, 2002, at B8 
(arguing that Israel would be subject to politicized prosecutions or politicized rulings because “the 
Rome Convention creates such vague offenses as ‘persecution,’ which involves violating 
‘fundamental rights.’. .[T]here is vast disagreement over what rights are ‘fundamental, and which 
of these rights are legally enforceable”).
78
 Yousef, 327 F.3d at 107-08.
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Piracy, unlike terrorism and crimes against humanity, had a narrow, 
precise and stable definition that all nations could agree on.79 Piracy was 
everywhere defined as robbery on the high seas without statute authorization; 
tying the definition to the well-understood crime of robbery made it even more 
tractable, and it is important to note that other crimes on the high seas would not 
fall under the definition. In the seminal piracy case of United States v. Smith, 
Justice Story asked precisely this question: “whether the crime of piracy is 
defined by the law of nations with reasonable certainty.”80 He quickly concluded 
that “[t]here is scarcely a writer on the law of nations, who does not allude to 
piracy as a crime of a settled and determinate nature . . . all writers concur, in 
holding, that robbery. . . upon the sea, animo furandi, is piracy.”81 It was because 
piracy has such a fixed definition in international law that the Court could easily 
conclude that Congress was within its rights in punishing it.
F. Necessary characteristics?
Piracy was a well-defined offense that was condemned by all nations; 
uniformly punished by all nations; committed by private actors who had rejected 
79 Dole v. New Eng. Mut. Marine Ins. Co., 7 F. Cas. 837, 847 (C.C.D. Mass. 1864) (No. 3966) 
(“[R]obbery on the high seas is piracy under the law of nations by all authorities.”); Fitfield v. Ins. 
Co. of Pa., 47 Pa. 166, 187 (1864) (“A pirate, according to the most approved definitions, is a sea 
robber.”); HM Advocate v. Cameron, 1971 S.L.T. 202, 205 (H.C.J. 1971) (“The essential elements 
of this crime are no more and no lessthan those which are requisite to a relevant charge of robbery 
where that crime is committed in respect of property on land and within the ordinary jurisdiction 
of the High Court.”); BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at 72 (“The offence of piracy . . . consists in 
committing those acts of robbery and depredation upon the high seas, which, if committed upon 
land, would have amounted to a felony there.”); James Kent, Commentaries, in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 87 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (“Piracy . . . is the same offense 
at sea with robbery on land; and all the writers on the law of nations, and on maritime law of 
Europe, agree in this definition of piracy.”).
80
 18 U.S. 153, 160 (1820).
81 Id. at 161.
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the protection of sovereign nations including their home state; took place on the 
high seas where enforcement was very difficult; and harmed the economic 
interests of many nations because it was directed at international commerce. All 
of these features coincided in the case of piracy, but that does not mean they were 
all necessary to its universal cogni zability. To e xtract lessons that could guide 
modern efforts at establishing universal offenses, the necessary elements must be 
separated from those that merely facilitated. And all of these elements must be 
separated from those that were merely characteristic of piracy but in no way 
helpful to its universal cognizability. 
The private actor criterion is demonstrably a necessary one. If the same 
conduct was committed by non-private actors, it would not be universally 
cognizable. Sea-raiders who received the protection of a sovereign state (not 
necessarily even their own) by obtaining a writ of marque were not subjects of 
UJ, and indeed the very purpose of these commissions was to insulate the bearer 
from prosecution. Similarly, the high seas locus was essential to UJ -- the same 
conduct would not be universally cognizable if it occurred on land. Private crime 
on the high seas was also not universally cognizable when it did not affect the 
interests of many nations: murder within a ship was not universally cognizable, 
unlike attacks on international commerce. As for uniform condemnation and 
uniform punishment, one cannot say for sure whether they were necessary 
conditions. Because piracy was the only universal offense, one cannot compare it 
to others offenses where the punishment varied from nation to nation. Nor were 
these factors essential elements of the offense of piracy itself, like private action 
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was. Still, as Part I.E showed, uniform punishment greatly reduces the problems 
associated with UJ. And it is hard to imagine a crime becoming truly universally 
cognizable if it is not universally condemned.
The discussion in Parts I.B. and I.C. revealed the inadequacy of existing 
explanations as to why two of these factors – locus and international harm –
would be important to UJ when they actually narrow UJ to a class of cases where 
it is unlikely to be implemented given the incentives of self-interested states. Still, 
it is clear as a historical matter that the negation of either element would have put 
the conduct outside of the scope of UJ. This suggests that UJ over piracy was 
either a badly conceived notion that none the less proved attractive to 
commentators and judges for centuries, or that subtler explanations exist for the 
phenomenon. Indeed, none of the necessary conditions explain why UJ would 
ever be exercised in practice. They are only the factors without which UJ would 
be so at odds with the interests of sovereign states that they would not even 
endorse it as an abstract principle. This begs the question of why universal 
jurisdiction over piracy would for so long be considered a useful concept. The 
puzzle of why nations would ever exercise UJ is explored in the next Part; Part III 
presents an explanation which reframes UJ as evidentiary rule, not an independent 
basis of jurisdiction.
II. THE RATIONAL CHOICE PARADOX OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
This Part raises a fundamental problem with the instrumental view of UJ –
why will disinterested states prosecute at all? The primary function of the new 
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universal jurisdiction is instrumental. It aims to deter violations of the relevant 
international human rights norms.82 Extending jurisdiction to every nation in the 
world will, NUJ advocates suggest, increase ex post enforcement, and thereby 
improve ex ante deterrence. At first glance, the increased deterrence prediction 
seems plausible: more possible prosecutors means less crime. But while UJ may 
increase deterrence if widely practiced (though even this is not obvious),83 there is 
no reason for rational, self-interested states to actually exercise it.
A. The rational choice approach. 
This Part looks at both the old and new UJ from a rational choice 
perspective. Rational choice models assume that states act to further their own 
interests (whatever those may be), and that they seek to achieve these goals in a 
82 See, e.g., Joyner, supra note 8, at 166 (explaining “the necessity of extending universal 
jurisdiction” to war crimes to create a “viable means for deterring similar crimes in the future”); 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: THE DUTY OF STATES TO ENACT AND 
IMPLEMENT LEGISLATION 20-21 (2001) (speculating that “the exercise of universal jurisdiction is 
likely to act as a general deterrent, at least to some extent, to crimes under international law” and 
observing that deterrence is “the most frequently cited grounds” for exercising universal 
jurisdiction).
83 There are several reasons to doubt that NUJ will increase deterrence. Human rights violators do 
not expect to come to justice at all. They know that if they fall into the hands of their victims they 
will be called to account, perhaps brutally and summarily. That they carry out their crimes anyway 
suggests that they either do not expect to lose power, or that the prospect of defeat and 
apprehension is outweighed by the current benefits of their actions. The exercise of NUJ over war 
criminals in the Yugoslav civil war did nothing to deter them, or subsequent violations in Kosovo 
by some of the same actors. This is a powerful criticism, but NUJ is new enough to be able to 
insulate itself from empirical criticism with the argument that deterrence will only be established 
when it becomes even more widespread and institutionalized; perhaps the reality of NUJ 
prosecution has not yet sunk in. But a well-established NUJ might reduce the level of deterrence. 
The NUJ tribunal will likely treat the offender far better, and impose a much lower punishment, 
than the tribunal with traditional jurisdictional links. In particular, no courts that have exercised 
NUJ impose the death penalty, while the victims’ or offenders’ states do have capital punishment; 
and the European and international tribunals that use NUJ are more scrupulous about due process 
protections than most nations’ courts. In short, the problems with deterrence stem in part from the 
existence of different punishments for the same NUJ offense; pirates, by contrast, received the 
same punishment from all tribunals. See Part I.E., infra.
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rational manner.84 This approach has long been a staple of both international 
relations scholarship and economic analysis of law. And the use of rational choice 
methodology has become commonplace in private law scholarship through the 
influence of the law and economics school. But international law scholarship has 
until recently entirely ignored this methodology.85 However, the rational choice 
approach has been gaining currency among an influential minority of international 
law scholars.86 They recognize that without the admittedly simplifying 
assumptions of the model one cannot have “a workable, let alone parsimonious, 
tool for explanation and prediction.”87
To the extent international law scholarship has been satisfied with purely 
normative approaches, the lack of a model would not be a loss.88 Advocates of 
84
 Fuller accounts of the rational choice model of state behavior, and its applicability to 
international law scholarship can be found in a pair of articles advocating the use of law and 
economics and international relations models. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, 
Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 20- 21 (1999); Kenneth W. Abbot, 
Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 335, 348-50 (1989).
85 See Steven R. Ratner, Precommitment Theory and International Law: Starting a Conversation, 
81 TEX. L. REV. 2055, 2056 (2003) (“The systematic application of rational choice theory to 
international law–as opposed to international relations–is a recent phenomenon. . . . Although the 
number of international law scholars doing interdisciplinary work is expanding, scholars applying 
rational choice theory remain relatively few in number.”).
86
 See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, International Agreements: A Rational Choice 
Approach, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 113 (2003); Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 DUKE L.J. 559, 
573-621 (2002) (using rational choice theory to explain customary international law); Jack L. 
Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 
(1999); Symposium, Rational Choice and International Law, 31. J. LEG. STUD. 1 (2002).
87
 Abbot, supra note 84, at 351.
88
 Some commentators do posit purely non-instrumental goals for NUJ – various advocates stress 
different ones – but the deterrence rationale dominates. See supra note 82. See also AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 82, at 20 (observing that deterrence is “the most frequently cited 
grounds” for exercising universal jurisdiction). Some advocate UJ for purely retributive or 
expressive purposes. In the retributive view, punishment is a worthy end in itself – offenders 
deserve punishment and victims have “a right to justice.” Id. at 13; see also PRINCETON 
PRINCIPLES, supra note 63, at 25, available at http://www.princeton.edu/~lapa/unive_jur.pdf.
(noting that drafters of Princeton Principles were “united in their desire to promote greater legal 
accountability for those accused of committing serious crimes under international law”). A related 
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NUJ do not specify any model at all; they do not provide explanations of why 
nations would systematically enforce NUJ that are linked to real incentives, or 
consider the costs and benefits faced by a prosecuting state.89 This Article, 
however, seeks to provide a positive explanation of UJ that is consistent with 
historical evidence. A model that generates a theory consistent with observed data 
can then be used to make predictions and not just normative recommendations
about whether ongoing efforts to expand NUJ would be expected to succeed, and 
whether such success would cause conflict between nations. Universal jurisdiction 
seeks to affect, and thus depends, on assumptions about the behavior of the states 
and other actors; understanding these requires a model of state behavior. Rational 
choice theory provides the most plausible model.
purpose of universal jurisdiction is expressive: by elevating certain crimes above the standard 
rules of international jurisdiction, nations demonstrate their deep repugnance at such crimes. Other 
commentators assign essentially aesthetic purposes to universal jurisdiction: they argue that it is 
simply unseemly for NUJ over heinous offenses not to exist. A positive analysis such as this one 
cannot meet such inherently normative visions on their own territory. However, even for those 
who favor universal jurisdiction for its own sake, rather than to alter the behavior of real actors, it 
would seem that nations would have to actually exercise NUJ for these non-instrumental purposes 
to be satisfied.
89 This is in part a consequence of international law scholarship’s focus on developing and 
articulating norms rather than positive and predictive accounts of conduct connected to the 
incentives faced by states. See generally Swaine, supra note 86, at 561 (“Rational choice theory 
may be considered alien to international law's norm-laden nature, but perhaps the critical 
perspective is needed.”); Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 84, at 3 (“[I]nternational legal 
scholarship too often combines careful doctrinal description–here is what the law is–with 
unfounded prescription–here is what the law should be. This scholarship often lacks any 
persuasively articulated connection between description and prescription, undermining the 
prescription.”); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding the Resemblance Between 
Modern and Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 663 (2000):
The main problem with international law scholarship, however, is that it is too 
normative. International law scholars spend too much time proclaiming the 
value of international law and bemoaning its many “violations,” and too little 
time understanding how international law actually works. In our view the latter 
inquiry is more fruitful, and international law scholarship would do well to 
follow the example of international relations theory in political science and 
focus on positive rather than normative inquiries.
Id.
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The notion of using universal jurisdiction to punish international offenses 
may be normatively attractive, but that alone cannot explain why states would 
actually do so. The previous Part showed why universal jurisdiction would cause 
relatively few problems in the context in which it originally arose and to which
for centuries it was exclusively confined. But just because something is relatively 
unproblematic does not mean it should be expected to happen. It would be 
unproblematic if everyone just got along, yet that has not happened. 
B. The paradox.
1. The public goods problem.
In the rational choice model of state behavior, universal jurisdiction 
appears to be a mirage, an empty set. Exercising universal jurisdiction is costly
for the forum state.90 This is why even directly-injured nations sometimes fail to 
prosecute. Gary Bass described the problem well:
The exercise of universal jurisdiction is politically costly for a 
state. It means embroiling one’s diplomatic apparatus in an 
imbroglio, and, quite likely, a confrontation with one or more 
states . . . it means burdening one’s court system with what will 
probably be an incredibly complex and problematic case; and it 
almost certainly means a great deal of domestic turmoil and 
controversy. Why would a country bother?91
90 See REYDAMS, supra note 40, at 222 (observing that because exercising UJ is costly, it is a 
jurisdictional luxury only the wealthiest states can afford); PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 63, 
at 27, available at http://www.princeton.edu/~lapa/unive_jur.pdf (“The assembly recognizes that a 
scarcity of resources, time and attention may impose practical limitations on the quest for perfect 
justice.”).
91 Garry J. Bass, The Adolf Eichmann Case: Universal and National Jurisdiction, in UNIVERSAL 
JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES 77-78, supra note 4
(suggesting that Eichmann suggests one reason a nation might exercise “universal jurisdiction” –
namely, it feels directly and distinguishably injured by the offense). This describes Israel’s 
position in Eichmann quite well, but it also explains why Eichmann was not an exercise of UJ.
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The standard sovereignty-based varieties of international jurisdiction 
already allow states to punish crimes committed by or against their nationals or on 
their territory. These are crimes that affect the interests of the forum state in a 
direct and material way. All that UJ adds is authorization for states that have not 
been materially harmed by the conduct to prosecute it. Universal jurisdiction 
gives unaffected states power, but provides no reason for them to exercise it. 
A nation exercising NUJ bears all the costs of prosecution while reaping 
none of the benefits. Nations have scarce prosecutorial and judicial resources. 
Given that universal jurisdiction is costly, one would expect it to be at best a last 
priority.92 While one might imagine nations exercising UJ when the costs are 
close to zero, this is not the situation in which UJ usually presents itself. 
Opportunities for UJ usually arise when the directly affected nations have chosen 
not to incur the costs of enforcement, even though they would reap most of the 
benefits. This suggests potential UJ cases involve a  combination of high 
enforcement cost and low enforcement benefits. Thus as a rough approximation, 
one would expect to see no universal prosecutions. Self-interested states would 
not expend real resources for inchoate benefits, especially when doing so would 
bestow real and unreciprocated benefits on the nations that have in fact been 
harmed by the conduct. 
In other words, punishing offenders of universal offenses entails the 
provision of a public good. A public good is one that is non-rivalrous –
consumption of the good by one state does not reduce its availability for others, 
92 See Kirby, supra note 4, at 256 (observing that judges with already heavy case loads could be 
expected to be hostile to claims of universal jurisdiction).
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and that is non-excludable – nations that do not contribute to the provision of the 
good cannot be excluded from sharing in its benefits. As a result, there are severe 
free-rider obstacles to the production of public goods, and thus they will be 
supplied at “less than optimal levels, if at all.”93 The provision of security on 
either a domestic or international level is a prototypical public good. International 
relations (“IR”) scholars have observed that international regimes that seek to 
produce public goods inevitably fail.94 Successful international regimes create 
methods of excluding non-contributing states.95 By contrast, a prosecuting state 
cannot exclude others from the benefits created by its exercise of UJ.
Universal jurisdiction over piracy thus cannot be explained simply by 
suggesting that it “allowed nations to cooperate in fighting this common 
scourge,”96 because such cooperation does not appear consistent with the 
incentives faced by rational states. Nor does UJ provide a method or incentives for 
creating such cooperation. It does not attempt to change the incentives facing 
nations. Indeed, if as modern commentators casually assume, the harm caused by 
UJ offenses somehow affects all nations, 97 the problem would be more severe 
93 Abbot, supra note 84, at 378.
94 See id. at 379 (describing the collective sanctions regime generally of the U.N. Charter’s Article 
VII and the Nuclear-Nonproliferation Treaty as examples of failed international efforts to produce 
the public good of security).
95
 Regional defense alliances, like NATO, do produce security because they can exclude non-
producers from the benefits. Similarly, the ability of nations to withdraw from such treaties when 
they suspect the others of free-riding, as the United States did when it exited the ANZUS treaty, 
also “functions as a form of exclusion.” See id. at 387.
96 See Osofsky, supra note 4, at 194 n.18.
97
 This argument has only been dimly articulated, but this is presumably what commentators mean 
when they argue that since “intercourse among states occurred primarily by way of the high seas,” 
and because piracy was indiscriminate in its targets, it was a matter of “concern to all states.” See 
Randall, supra note 10, at 795. 
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than if it disproportionately affected some nations. The high seas have been 
described as a global commons. To pursue the analogy, pirates are weeds or pests 
infesting the commons.98 However, in the absence of centralized government, 
commons do not get policed – thus the problem of the commons.99 Self-interested 
states would not be expected to police a commons any more than self-interested 
private individuals would, without compensation, mow the town square’s lawn.
2) The coordination problem.
The rational choice model reveals a related difficulty with UJ-based 
deterrence – a coordination or first-mover problem. The set of nations directly 
injured by a given international crime is small and defined. Often it is only one 
nation. Under traditional theories of international jurisdiction, the directly affected
nations have proper incentives to prosecute, because if they do not no one will. 
Thus they must weigh the costs and the benefits of prosecution and act when the 
latter outweigh the former. Universal jurisdiction allows every nation in the world 
to prosecute international crimes, but does not affirmatively put the responsibility 
on any particular uninjured nation. Every uninjured nation is authorized to 
prosecute, but none is required to do so. No nation has any obvious reason to step 
in front and assume the burden; rather all would be expected to wait for another to 
step forward and act in the name of the “international community.” 
Worse still, even the nations that have been directly injured by an 
international crime would have their incentive to take action diminished by the 
98 See Abbot, supra note 84, at 380.
99 See Abbot, supra note 84, at 378-79 (describing commons problem in the international law 
context).
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possibility of universal jurisdiction. The nominal possibility that other nations will 
shoulder the enforcement burden may make it more likely that the injured nation 
save itself the burden of prosecution in the hopes that some other state would 
launch a UJ prosecution. Of course UJ will only create moral hazard for an
injured nation if it believes that UJ will be exercised by another nation, and it is 
not clear why nations would have such unrealistic expectations. But in situations 
where the benefits of prosecution only slightly outweigh the costs, even a small 
perceived probability that another state would assert UJ may deter prosecution  by 
the state with traditional jurisdiction.
3) General vs. local injury.
The degree of the rational choice problem increases the more local is the 
injury caused by the UJ offense. As Part I.C. showed, many commentators and 
courts contend that the widespread injury caused by piracy contributed to its 
universal cognizabilty. Of course piracy injured some nations more than others, 
and any particular pirate ship may only have attacked the ships of one or a few 
nations. Still, merchant ships were the primary vehicles of international 
commerce, and carried multinational cargoes, and thus threats to merchant vessels 
would create real injury to the economic interests of many states. As this part has 
shown, when an injury is borne by many states, the incentives for all of them to 
deal with the conduct are reduced because enforcement is a public good.
But NUJ offenses do not harm many nations. They are usually purely 
internal human rights abuses, or in the case of war crimes, human rights abuses in 
a single neighboring state. When the conduct does not harm other nations at all, it 
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becomes even more unlikely that they would exercise UJ. Of course, proponents 
of NUJ sometimes contend that massive human rights offenses hurt all nations by 
weakening respect for international norms. But this purported “universal injury” 
argument is purely metaphorical. It is completely abstract and inchoate; it is at 
best a “words” rather than a “sticks and stones” injury.
To be sure, conduct can have remote and indirect consequences; how 
general an injury is is a matter of degree. Even purely internal conduct can have 
spillover effects. But piracy, directed against the ships of many nations and 
immediately harming the economic interests of even more nations, is clearly far 
removed on this continuum from genocide, torture, war crimes, and even the 
general-sounding “crimes against humanity.” These NUJ offenses are committed 
against specific internal populations. Spillover consequences are largely inchoate,
moral or aesthetic. For example, the Rwandan genocide was a tremendous 
calamity for the inhabitants of that nation. And it outraged many who read about 
it outside of Rwanda. But this is not a direct or concrete injury, as evidenced by 
the fact that those foreign observers who were thus injured did not feel badly 
enough about it to stop the atrocities. 
Of course, if conduct harms many nations, free rider problems may exist 
regardless of the jurisdictional rule. With piracy, the economic injury inflicted by 
pirates usually falls on several nations – the importing and the exporting nation, 
and any other nation with a commercial interest in the vessel or cargo. For while 
the cost of  apprehension and prosecution must fall entirely on one nation, that 
nation would capture only a fraction of the benefit from its efforts, while 
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bestowing positive externalities on the other nations harmed by the particular 
pirates. This suggests that UJ over general injuries may simply recapitulate 
existing free rider problems. Even in this view, it seems that UJ cannot achieve 
any instrumental purposes such as deterrence. 
4) The externalities problem.
There is also the opposite of the public good problem: while nations that 
exercise UJ do not internalize the benefits of their actions, they may also not 
internalize the full cost. This is the problem that arises when a UJ prosecution 
threatens to disrupt a post-conflict national amnesty or reconciliation program. 
These programs are like settlements of lawsuits: one side waives its claims against 
the other in exchange for some consideration, such as an admission of 
wrongdoing or a promise to not participate in politics. Settlements are designed, 
among other things, to reduce the volatility of outcomes for both sides. For one 
side, the release of claims accomplishes this. But UJ vests claims in all nations, 
making the release worth much less as an inducement to members of the former 
regime. Thus, as many commentators have observed, UJ may make a peaceful 
resolution of internal conflicts more difficult. Also, as discussed herein,100 UJ may 
reduce the deterrent effect of domestic punishment. These are all real costs of UJ 
but none of them are internalized by the prosecuting nation.
The non-internalization of some costs by a nation asserting UJ does not 
eliminate the original paradox. So long as costs are positive and direct benefits 
non-existent (which again is the definition of UJ), then one would not predict 
100 See supra note 81.
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regular enforcement. However, the lack of full cost internalization gives reason to 
be concerned about any observed UJ cases. There may be occasional situations 
where the cost of exercising UJ to the prosecuting state will be sufficiently close 
to zero. For example, the defendant may have been apprehended in the nation’s 
territory on other charges; proof of his guilt is well documented and thus the 
administrative costs of prosecution are low; and his home nation is weak and far 
away, and thus incapable of creating problems for the prosecuting nation.
Prosecution may occur in such situations even though it would not be optimal 
from a “global” perspective because the prosecuting nation makes the 
enforcement decision without internalizing the full costs. Put differently, a 
prosecuting nation may be externalizing costs onto the nations with traditional 
jurisdiction – the costs of disrupting amnesty and reconciliation processes.  
C. A piracy example.
An episode involving Chinese pirates amply illustrates the high costs of 
enforcement and the probable unwillingness of nations to incur such costs when 
the benefits would redound largely (but not entirely) to others. Both the South 
China Sea and the Yangtze River had long been infested with pirates (the former 
remains among the most dangerous waters in the world). British shipping 
companies owned many vessels that carried passengers and goods, primarily 
Chinese, in these waters. The British ships were regularly attacked by pirates.101
The cost of protecting these vessels in far-off waters was quite high, and the 
British government finally decided that it did not want to bear it. So the 
101 See China Navigation Co. v. Attorney-General, [1932] 2 K.B. 197 (Eng. C.A.).
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government required the British ship-owners themselves to pay the Crown for the 
cost of protection; otherwise, the forces would be withdrawn and the companies 
left to fend for themselves.102 In other words, Britain – at the time the world’s 
mightiest naval power, with considerable economic interests in China – did not 
want to bear the costs of protecting its own ships, admittedly extensions of its own 
territory,103 from pirates. If even powerful nations were reluctant to expend 
resources on enforcement when they were directly harmed because they would 
not recoup the full benefits, this suggests at the very least that there was nothing 
about piracy that would inspire disinterested or tangentially affected nations to 
punish out of a general solicitude for the sanctity of international law.
The shipping companies filed suit for a refund of the monies paid to the 
government for their protection, arguing that the Crown was obligated to provide 
this service free of charge.104 The suit failed on what amounted to standing 
grounds; the King’s decisions about the deployment of his forces are entirely 
discretionary and not subject to judicial challenge, much like prosecutorial 
discretion. However, in affirming this conclusion, the Court of Appeal made two 
observations quite relevant to the rational choice paradox of universal jurisdiction.
First, the justices noted that the ships belonged to commercial enterprises 
that internalize all the benefits of their journeys but seek to externalize the 
enforcement costs. The profits went to the companies but the costs were borne by 
102 Id. at 198, 210.
103 Id. at 212 (Scrutton, L.J.).
104 Id. at 220-21.
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the Crown.105 The Court thought it reasonable to require those who obtain the 
benefit from the suppression of piracy to foot the bill.106 Second, while the ships 
were British, the judgments repeatedly noted that the primary character of their 
commerce was Chinese – the vessels carried Chinese nationals and Chinese-
owned cargo from one place in China to another.107 Thus a large portion of
positive externalities or surplus created by these activities was enjoyed by China, 
giving the Crown even less reason to expend its resources on the piracy problem. 
And one justice noted that need for British forces arose from the commerce taking 
place “in neighborhoods inefficiently policed by foreign Governments”108 --
implying that a better solution would be for China itself to reign in its pirates.
D. Altruism and hegemony: rational choice explanations for UJ.
To be sure, there are gaps in the rational choice/self-interested state 
account of universal jurisdiction. Some nations with a direct stake may fail to
prosecute not because it would not be worth their while, but because they are 
incapable of doing so, due to lack of judicial resources, insufficient security or 
general political instability in the wake of a ruinous war. While the rational choice 
105 See id. at 212 (Scrutton, L.J.) (“A shipowner, without the assent of the Crown, trades for 
purposes of his own profit. . . . Has the Crown a legal duty to protect the shipowner against the 
criminal action of the passengers whom the shipowner himself has invited aboard?”) (emphasis 
added); id. at 223 (Lawrence, L.J.) (“[T]he plaintiff company . . has asked the Crown by means of 
its armed forces to assist it to continue its Chinese passenger traffic with more safety and thus 
enable it to earn the resulting profit.”) (emphasis added).
106 Id. at 223 (Lawrence, L.J.) (“I entirely agree with the view expressed by the Crown to the 
shipowners that the provision of preventive measures against internal piracy is essentially a matter 
for the owners and forms no part of the duty of the Crown.”) (emphasis added).
107 Id. (noting repeatedly that ships were engaged in “Chinese passenger traffic”); id. at 212 
(observing that the plaintiff “for his profit . . . takes on board large numbers of foreign passengers
. . . to a foreign port”) (emphasis added).
108 Id. at 212 (Scrutton, L.J.).
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model posits that nations act to advance their interests, like other economic 
models it does not stipulate what those interests are. Rather, it takes preferences 
as exogenous. Sometimes nations undertake costly actions for altruistic reasons, 
out of magnanimity and moral impulses.109 Disaster relief, foreign aid, and 
humanitarian military interventions are examples. NUJ can be seen as authorizing 
a kind of ex post humanitarian intervention. But such analogs also tell us about 
the limits of altruism-based NUJ. It will only be exercised when the costs are 
small, and when it coincides with other national interests110 – i.e., with a strong 
preference for helping friends and allies, or otherwise concurrently serving a 
nation’s foreign policy goals. Humanitarian intervention, after all, is quite rare, 
especially in proportion to the occasions for it.
Thus a finer estimate of states’ willingness to exercise UJ would predict 
rare and aberrant prosecution of offenders, limited to cases where the costs of 
doing so are particularly low (perhaps when there is strong political or public 
support for it, guilt is easy to prove, and the offender is already in custody). Such 
prosecutions would remain exceptional, and thus add little deterrent power to 
international norms. This prediction is consistent with the evidence. Over several 
hundred years, there were only a few UJ prosecutions of pirates. There is little 
historical evidence for the view that nations thought piracy so harmful to world 
order that they would set aside their parochial interests to punish it. Indeed, not 
only did nations almost never pursue pirates that had not directly wronged them, 
109 See Abbot, supra note 84, at 352 n.93 (observing that “states infrequently act in ways that even 
appear altruistic) (emphasis added).
110 See id. at 352.
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they often openly tolerated pirates that preyed on rival nations.111 And despite the 
growth of the concept in recent decades, actual exercises of UJ remain rare. 
Moreover, with both piracy and NUJ offenses, jurisdiction is exclusively 
exercised by wealthy and powerful industrialized states over defendants from 
poor and powerless states, precisely because such prosecutions are the least 
costly. In such cases there is little danger of international conflict over assertions 
of NUJ because weak nations cannot effectively defend against perceived 
incursions on their sovereignty, the political and military costs for powerful 
nations of exercising NUJ are relatively low.
Moreover, the few instances where UJ over pirates was put into practice 
fit the rational choice model -- not as examples of altruism, but rather as examples 
of “hegemonic stability.” Britain was invariably the nation exercising UJ.112
Britain also accounted for a vast proportion of the world’s maritime trade. 
Generally, nations will not provide public goods because they receive only a 
fraction of the benefits but pay all the costs. However, when a nation or its 
interests is “large enough to realize benefits from production of a good greater 
than its total costs [it] should be willing to bear those costs itself, providing the 
[public good] for the entire beneficiary group.”113 (This is a general economic 
phenomenon: the larger an actor’s stake in something, the more likely they are to 
provide related public goods or not succumb to the tragedy of the commons.)
Appropriately enough, one of the most famous examples of “hegemonic stability” 
111 See Barbour, supra note 48, at 545 -56 (describing English tolerance of piracy against the 
Spanish).
112 See Rubin, supra note 6. 
113
 Abbot, supra note 84, at 383.
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in international relations theory involves the related phenomenon of Britain’s 
sponsorship of liberal trade regimes in the 19th century.114 It made sense for 
Britain to impose this unilaterally on other nations because Britain had such a 
large share of world trade.115
III. RESOLVING THE PARADOX: UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AS AN 
EVIDENTIARY RULE
Part II showed that in a rational choice model, making an offense 
universally cognizable will not increase enforcement or deterrence. Yet a positive 
theory of UJ should also be consistent with observed phenomenon. Why would 
the courts of self-interested nations pay lip service to UJ over piracy if it would be 
useless? A good positive theory of UJ must answer this question, while also
explaining why UJ applied only to piracy, and why it was used so rarely. This 
Part introduces a new way of thinking about the true purposes and functions of UJ 
over piracy, an explanation that is both consistent with the rational choice model 
and with facts of piracy’s treatment as a UJ offense. 
A. Hostis humani generis as an evidentiary presumption.
The “universal” status of piracy was not so much about jurisdiction as it 
was about evidence of jurisdiction. UJ was an evidentiary rule that facilitated the 
prosecution of crimes over which it would be difficult for nations to affirmatively 
prove the existence of traditional territorial or national jurisdiction. It was not
primarily used to suspend or expand the traditional sovereignty-based rules of 
114 See id. at 384.
115 Id. at 384-85.
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international jurisdiction, but rather as an evidentiary presumption, an aid to the 
assertion of traditional jurisdiction. 
This explanation has the advantage of being both consistent with the 
unique characteristics of piracy, while at the same time resolving the rational 
choice paradox . It explains why even purely self-interested states would find UJ 
over piracy useful, and how such jurisdiction could in fact improve enforcement. 
Moreover, it is consistent with the actual pattern of cases expounding on the 
universal jurisdiction principle – consistent, that is, with both the extraordinary 
paucity of such cases and the fact that, in the U.S. at least, universal jurisdiction 
principles were often proclaimed in cases where U.S. nationals seem to have real 
culpability. While the account presented here makes UJ over piracy far less 
mysterious as a positive phenomenon, it also shows that piracy UJ has nothing in 
common with NUJ. If UJ is really an evidentiary rule, then modern UJ appears as 
a new, untried and ambitious jurisdictional experiment untethered to the historical 
experience of piracy from which it claims to draw its inspiration. 
B. Difficulties in proving jurisdiction over pirates.
As Part I showed, one of the outstanding characteristics of piracy was its 
multinational character. Piracy was international both on the side of the victim 
and the perpetrator. Indeed, maritime commerce always had a “peculiarly 
multinational complexion.”116 Ships, even men-of-war, were routinely crewed by 
sailors of different nationalities. A pirate ship, composed of outlaws, refugees, 
116
 Henry J. Steiner, Book Review, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1710 (1963).
Page 53 of 67
exiles, deserters, escaped slaves and other outcasts was even more cosmopolitan 
than the typical merchantman.117 Traditional bases of jurisdiction already allowed 
many states to prosecute pirates -- those states with an incentive to do so.118
 The international character of pirates’ victims added a further layer of 
jurisdictional complexity. Because the ships of many nations plied the sea routes, 
and because pirates were generally (but not always) politically neutral, they could 
be expected to attack the ships of many different maritime states.119 Pirate ships 
were almost never caught in the act; rather, they were apprehended when they 
returned to port looking suspicious. And unless the pirate ship was caught in the 
act, the forum state might have little evidence as to what particular nation’s ships 
the pirate had attacked. This again is a consequence of the locus of the crime. By 
the time the pirate has been apprehended, the victim ships could be on the other 
side of the world. There may be witnesses able to identify the pirate crew or their 
ships (though pirates frequently repainted, refitted and changed their vessels, wore 
befuddling costumes, and took more ruthless measures to avoid witness 
identification) but these witnesses would also be in parts unknown, their 
testimony expensive or impossible to secure. Thus a nation could have an 
obviously piratical vessel in custody, and as an abstract matter have jurisdiction 
117 See CORDINGLY, supra note 16, at 12, 14-15 (describing multinational character of pirate crews 
in 17th and 18th centuries).
118 See Steiner, supra note 116, at 1710 (“The varied aspects of a ship – its nationality 
and that of its owner, the origin of its crew. . . and so on – create relationships with and 
invite the exercise of jurisdiction by several nations.”); Cowles, supra note 44, at 185-87 
(explaining universal jurisdiction over piracy by reference to the criminal groups being 
“made up of members of more than one nationality”).
119 See generally, CORDINGLY, supra note 16, at 88 (describing cruising grounds of pirates).
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over it under national or territorial principles of jurisdiction, but yet have no way 
of specifically proving the existence of such traditional jurisdiction.
The promiscuous nature of piratical attacks has long been associated with 
universal jurisdiction. Pirates were famously denounced as “hostis humani 
generis,” and this term has come to be nearly synonymous with universal 
jurisdiction itself.120 However, modern courts and commentators have 
misunderstood the significance of the “hostis humani generis” characterization. 
The term has sometimes been regarded as one of opprobrium – the pirates are so 
bad that they are everyone’s enemy.121 This understanding of hostis humani 
generis proceeds from the assumption that piracy was, like NUJ offenses, 
universally cognizable because of its heinousness, and finds in that term evidence 
that it was regarded as uniquely heinous. The deficiencies of this account have 
been described in a previous article.122
But it is no accident that this phrase became attached to piracy – the 
indiscriminate nature of piratical aggression made it probable that a maritime 
nation that apprehended a pirate in fact had been wronged by him and thus had 
jurisdiction over him. It may have been more likely than not that a pirate held in 
custody had either already attacked the shipping of the forum state, or would have 
done so had he not been apprehended. (The likelihood of this is increased given 
that nations would be most inclined to police the sea lanes most heavily traveled 
120 See Randall, supra note 10, at 794 & n. 51.
121 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[F]or purposes of
civil liability, the torturer has become—like the pirate . . . before him—
hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”).
122 See Kontorovich, supra note 1.
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by their merchant ships.) Thus universal jurisdiction could be seen not as a 
suspension of traditional sovereignty-based jurisdiction, but rather as a pragmatic 
adoption of a probabilistic approach to Westphalian jurisdiction.
Having jurisdiction in the abstract is one thing, proving it in court is 
another. Some of the difficulties of proving who the pirates had attacked have 
already been mentioned. But even establishing the nationality of a piratical 
defendant or pirate ship – which could be a basis for municipal jurisdiction –
would be very difficult as well. Indeed, pirates adopted numerous ruses to obscure 
their true nationality. A pirate ship carried the flags of many nations, flying each 
when it most suited its purposes,123 and often carried registration papers 
(sometimes forged) identifying it as a ship of different states. The nationality of 
pirates itself could be obscure – they were a nomadic lot, who had often long 
since abandoned their native land.124 Moreover, in the age of sail nations did not 
issue passports or otherwise keep any accounts of their nationals. Especially when 
the defendant’s purported home state is across the sea, determining his true 
nationality could be nearly impossible. 
C. Presumptions and burden-shifting.
The previous section showed that, ironically, even though pirates injured 
multiple nations and were thus within the traditional jurisdiction of those nations, 
it might be impossible for any nation to prove that it had jurisdiction over them. 
The pirates would benefit from the very nature of their criminality. It is not 
123 See CORDINGLY, supra note 16, at 114-15.
124 See id. at 89 (explaining seasonal migration of pirates).
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surprising that no legal system found this result attractive or tolerable, and that the 
law devised tools to ensure pirates could be prosecuted despite a lack of evidence 
of jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction was a legal fiction invoked to prevent those
who hurt everyone from not being able to be punished by anyone . 
Universal jurisdiction as an evidentiary rule in effect assumes that any 
nation wishing to exercise jurisdiction in fact has Westphalian (national or 
territorial) jurisdiction. Like many evidentiary presumptions, it is based on an 
assessment of probabilities.125 A pirate apprehended by a nation might be thought 
to be likely to have committed offenses against the forum state vessel’s, or to 
have been prepared to do so but for his apprehension. While this likelihood would 
not necessarily arise to a greater-than-not level, the difficulty in many cases of 
establishing jurisdiction through evidence could leave impunity as the only 
alternative to the presumption. In a somewhat weaker form, the presumption 
would be rebutable. Rather, it would shift the burden to defendant to prove the 
lack of proper jurisdiction under the sovereignty-based models. Such burden 
shifting makes sense, and is quite common, when the relevant knowledge is in the 
particular possession of the defendant.126 Before the rise of 20th century 
bureaucratic state, the defendant would best know his own nationality, and have 
125 See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 343 (4th ed. 1992) (“Generally ... the most important 
consideration in the creation of presumptions is probability.”); id. § 337, (“Perhaps a more 
frequently significant consideration in the fixing of the burdens of proof is the judicial estimate of 
the probabilities of the situation.”); Edward W. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on 
Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5, 12-13 (1959) (observing that presumptions are often 
determined by “a judicial, i.e., wholly nonstatistical, estimate of the probabilities of the 
situation”); Edmund M. Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. 
REV. 906, 911 (1931).
126 See Cleary, supra note 125, at 12 (suggesting that the burden of proof is often allocated to the 
party who controls the evidence relating to that element); Morgan, supra note 125, at 929-30.
Page 57 of 67
access to the best proof of it (family witnesses and so forth). The pirates would 
often be the only ones who know the nationality of the ships they attacked.
D. Illustrations from leading cases.
Illustrations of both the problems of proof to which universal jurisdiction 
responded, and its actual use as an evidentiary rule, can be found in some of the 
leading American cases on universal jurisdiction over piracy. United States v. 
Holmes127 was the last of a trilogy of important piracy cases decided during the 
Supreme Court’s 1820 term; most of the Court’s pronouncements about universal 
jurisdiction over the crime comes from these cases.128 The multinational character 
of piracy is evident in Holmes. The ship captured by the defendants was 
“apparently Spanish,” but there was neither documentary nor testimonial evidence 
establishing even this basic jurisdictional fact.129 Nor was there any evidence of 
the flag which the capturing vessels flew: they carried no documents, and it was 
not clear who owned them. The ships had sailed out of Buenos Aires, where they 
had taken on a typically divers crew of Frenchmen, Englishmen and 
Americans.130 Thus while there were no facts on which to solidly establish 
jurisdiction, it did appear that the attacking vessels were essentially an American 
problem. One of the two captains was an American, and the ship had been built in 
127
 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 412, 418-19 (1820).
128 The other cases were United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144 (1820); United States 
v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820). Cf. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 
(1818).
129
 Holmes, 18 U.S. at 414 (reporting that the vessel’s “national character . . . was not distinctly 
proved by any documentary evidence, or by the testimony of any person”).
130 Id. 
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Baltimore. But while there was no proof the attacking vessels were American, the 
Court also found that it “did not appear by any legal proof” that they were flagged 
by any other nation;131 their voyage to Buenos Aires appears to have been for 
piratical purposes and not to change nationality.
Thus the Court was faced with what appeared to be a piratical attack by a 
U.S. vessel and a U.S. defendant on a foreign ship, but the rootlessness and spotty 
record keeping of the pirates meant that U.S. jurisdiction could only be inferred 
from the absence of evidence to the contrary. The admissible evidence did not 
establish the ship to be within U.S. territorial jurisdiction, and yet the fact that the 
captains and the ship both came from America suggested that it was. The Court 
had to choose between crafting a jurisdictional fiction that would allow these 
“non-national” pirates to be punished, or to allow them to go free. It chose the 
former course and upheld the indictments. Drawing on Palmer, which had 
established a quasi-universal jurisdiction over “stateless” vessels, the Court held 
that lack of proof of jurisdiction would not bar a piracy prosecution.132 The 
Certificate of the Court looks like it affirms under a universal jurisdiction 
principle. But UJ only exists when there is no other ground for jurisdiction; the 
real problem in Holmes was not a lack of territorial jurisdiction but rather the 
inability to prove it. Indeed, the Court explicitly establishes a burden-shifting 
evidentiary presumption: “Under these circumstances, the Court is of opinion, that 
the burthen of proof of the national character of the vessel on board of which the 
131 Id. at 418.
132 Id. at 420 (“That the said Circuit Court had jurisdiction of the offence charged in the 
indictment, although the vessel on board of which the offence was committed was not, at the time, 
owned by a citizen, or citizens of the United States, and was not lawfully sailing under its flag.”).
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offence was committed, was on the prisoners.”133 Presumably, if the ship-owners 
could prove that they were French or Spanish, the indictment would be dismissed. 
Similarly, one of the 19th century cases most beloved by proponents of 
NUJ is in fact not about universal jurisdiction as such but rather about using 
universality as a legal fiction when American jurisdiction exists but cannot be 
easily proven. Justice Story’s dizzying opinion in La Jeune Eugenie134 has been 
embraced by modern commentators as an endorsement of universal jurisdiction 
based on the heinousness of the offense,135 and of the view that new offenses can 
become universally cognizable by analogy to piracy as the conscious of the 
civilized world develops. In fact it stands for none of these propositions, because 
it was not in substance a universal jurisdiction case. Rather, it stands for the 
proposition that when there an ample jurisdictional nexus between the United 
States and the offense, courts will ignore defects in the proof of jurisdiction. 
The case stemmed from the seizure of a slave-trading ship off the coast of 
Africa by a U.S. warship, which had been sent there to enforce Congress’s ban on 
the slave trade. The ship was libeled in Boston, where its owners demanded its 
return. The captured vessel flew the French flag and carried proper French papers. 
133 Id. at 419.
134 United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 840-42 (C.C. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551).
135 See, e.g., Randall, supra note 10, at 791 & n.29 (citing La Juene Eugenie as establishing federal 
court jurisdiction under UJ principles over pirates with no connection to the United States). See 
also Ralph G. Steinhardt, Fulfilling the Promise of Filartiga: Litigating Human Rights Claims 
Against the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 65, 75 & n. 49 (1995) (citing La 
Jeune Eugenie as evidence that federal courts can hold individuals accountable for violations of 
international law even absent congressional provision of a private right of action). 
Page 60 of 67
It sailed from Basseterre to Africa, crewed by Spaniards and Italians. The 
claimants and French diplomats also protested the assertion of U.S. jurisdiction.136
This lead Justice Story to his labyrinthine consideration of whether slave 
trading, being morally repugnant and having been condemned by many (but not 
all) nations had become universally cognizable along the lines of piracy.137 But 
this famous portion of the opinion is purely dicta for two reasons. First, after 
arguing that he would have universal jurisdiction, Story ultimately refused to 
entertain the case, and instead ordered the vessel returned to the French to avoid 
aggravating America’s foreign relations. 
Second, and what is relevant for the present discussion, La Jeune Eugenie 
was not a true universal jurisdiction case. As in Holmes, the ship was an American
one, but had resorted to a variety of subterfuges to hide from American 
jurisdiction. This was the primary argument of Blake and Webster in defending 
jurisdiction, and it is actually the first issue Story decided. The American 
character of the ship was clearly sufficient for jurisdiction,138 and the subsequent 
discussion of universal jurisdiction turns on an admittedly counterfactual 
assumption about the vessel’s nationality.139
From the outset, Story suggests that the vessel’s French character is a ruse:
136 Id. at 840 (noting that “there is also a protest filed by the French consul against the jurisdiction 
of the court, upon the ground that this is a French vessel, owned by French subjects, and, as such, 
exclusively liable to the jurisdiction of the French tribunals.”).
137 Id. at 846-50.
138 Id. at 841 (holding that regardless of other jurisdictional “difficulties,” American ownership of 
a vessel is sufficient to defeat the claimant’s request).
139 Id. at 842 (beginning discussion of universal jurisdiction over slave trading with “supposing the 
vessel to be established to be French”) (emphasis added).
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In respect to the ownership, it has been already stated, that 
the vessel was sailing under the customary documents of France, 
as a French vessel; and certainly in ordinary cases these would 
furnish prima facie a sufficient proof that the vessel was really 
owned by the persons, whose names appear upon the papers. In 
ordinary times, and under ordinary circumstances, when disguises 
are not necessary or important to cloak an illegal enterprise, or 
conceal a real ownership, the ship's papers are admitted to import, 
if not an absolute verity, at least such proof, as throws it upon 
persons, asserting a right in contradiction to them, to make out a 
clear title establishing their falsity. But if the trade is such, that 
disguises and frauds are common; if it can be carried on only under 
certain flags with safety or success; it is certainly true, that the 
mere fact of regular ship’s papers cannot be deemed entirely 
satisfactory to any court accustomed to know, how easily they are 
procured by fraud and imposition upon public officers, and how 
eagerly they are sought by those, whose cupidity for wealth is 
stimulated and schooled by temptations of profit, to all manner of 
shifts and contrivances.140
Story found that there was ample evidence that the vessel was really an 
American one: “this schooner is American built, and was American owned, and 
that within about two years she was naturalized in the French marine in the port of 
her departure.”141 The French ownership was merely “nominal,” a “disguise” 
adopted by “American citizens” to “facilitate . . . their escape from 
punishment.”142 The ease of masking national identity in an enterprise that takes 
place across the seas, among foreigners and with foreign crews, requires courts to 
be particularly vigilant to the substance of jurisdiction rather than its form. Story 
announced that he will not “shut his eyes” to the real jurisdiction; he will 
penetrate beyond “the surface of causes” and deal with things as everyone knows 
them to be, rather than as they superficially appear. Despite his fondness for 
140 Id. at 840-41.
141 Id. at 841.
142 Id. 
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natural law and formalism, Story wrote that “I should manifest a false delicacy 
and unjustifiable tenderness for abstract maxims” if he ignored the substantial 
American connection to the vessel. Yet he could not establish the American 
involvement through proof either, and thus reversed the burden of proof, which 
normally lies on those wishing to invoke a federal court’s jurisdiction.143
Universal jurisdiction is exercised when the forum state has no connection 
with the offense. Yet La Jeune Eugenie is about what will be required to prove
such a connection, not about what could be done if it did not exist. Story 
announces what is in fact an evidentiary rule. The ship will be treated as an 
American one unless the “ostensible” foreign owners “should give affirmative 
evidence” that their title is not pretextual. Story suggests claimants must produce 
a bill of sale that establishes the transfer of title from the American owners was 
for “valuable consideration.” In other words, the case will be presumed to be 
within territorial U.S. jurisdiction unless those opposing jurisdiction prove that the 
case “has no admixture of American interests.” 
Clearly such a jurisdictional presumption cannot be applied in all cases; 
Story is not suggesting that prosecutors will never need to establish jurisdiction. 
Rather, some of the very characteristics that would today be regarded as relevant 
to making an offense universally cognizable are the ones that a court would look 
to in deciding whether to switch the burden of proof on jurisdiction. First, the 
crime involves international shipping on the high seas, which has a particularly 
143 See Hogan v. Foison, 35 U.S. 160 (1836) (Story, J.) (holding that the plaintiff-in-error bears the 
burden of proof on facts necessary to establish the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction). Note that in 
La Jeune Eugenie, the government was the appellant, as the claimants had won a pro forma decree 
from the district court in an unreported decision. See La Jeune Eugenie, 13 F. Cas. 579 (No. 7301) 
(1821). 
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multinational dimension that makes it easy for perpetrators to use false flags and 
other ruses to immunize themselves from prosecution. But Story also suggests the 
burden-switching will not apply even to all such crimes. A second factor is 
relevant here. Burden-switching would not be inequitable as applied to slave 
traders because “a traffic of this nature [is] so little reconcilable with good faith or 
sound morals.” Thus the opprobrium that attaches to the crime, be it slavery or 
piracy, was in Story’s view relevant -- but not to establishing universal 
jurisdiction over it, but rather to reversing the burden of proof for territorial and 
national jurisdiction.
E. The significance of the evidentiary rule.
Universal jurisdiction as an evidentiary rule is not about expanding 
jurisdictional frontiers. Rather, it is used specifically in those cases where a 
jurisdictional nexus exists between the defendant and the forum state. The 
doctrine facilitated prosecutions under sovereignty-based categories of 
jurisdiction.144 This explains how universal jurisdiction could be a useful principle 
despite the enforcement paradox described in Part II. As an evidentiary rule, UJ 
need not encourage additional enforcement by non-affected states to have value. 
Rather, it encourages enforcement by states that already have some incentive to 
do so. By reducing the cost of proving jurisdiction (by removing one of the 
elements the prosecution would normally have to establish), it lowers the costs of 
enforcement precisely in those cases where the benefits of enforcement to the 
144
 The evidentiary rule does not explain all observed uses of UJ. Some may be products of 
altruism or hegemonic stability, as explained in Part II.D. But those reasons for UJ are not general 
enough to account for the broad and longstanding acceptance that piracy UJ enjoyed. U.S. courts 
endorsed the doctrine at a time when America was neither hegemonic nor altruistic. The doctrine 
must have had some other use to these nations, namely, its value as an evidentiary rule. 
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forum state are positive. Thus it would in fact result in increased enforcement of 
piracy laws. In particular, it would allow nations to prosecute those pirates whose 
nationality (or rather the proof of it), or the nationality of their victims, has been 
obscured by time, distance or deception.
This account also explains why there on rare occasion “true” UJ 
prosecutions of pirates. Universal jurisdiction as an evidentiary rule is essentially 
probabilistic jurisdiction. It is based on the likelihood that there is an actual basis 
for traditional jurisdiction, but not one that can be cheaply proved. Since it is a 
matter of likelihoods, some true UJ cases might get swept in along with those 
where jurisdiction is merely difficult to prove.  Every presumption based on 
probabilities will be over-inclusive (and under-inclusive). But the few true UJ 
cases that might be swept in would not reflect the essence of the hostis humani 
generis concept, but rather be a byproduct of it.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has presented a positive account of universal jurisdiction that 
is consistent with the historical evidence and with rational choice models. It 
shows that UJ has substantial limitations and problems. Indeed, self-interested
nations cannot be expected to exercise UJ with any regularity. But this Article has 
also shown that UJ has a previously unappreciated role – not as an independent 
basis of jurisdiction, but rather as an evidentiary rule that facilitates the proof of 
territorial or national jurisdiction.
Page 65 of 67
This improved understanding of UJ’s has cautionary implications for 
current efforts to expand it beyond piracy to a broad range of human rights 
offenses. The new universal jurisdiction (“NUJ) invokes piracy UJ to legitimize 
itself, but the positive understanding of piracy UJ developed in this Article 
suggests that it has little in common with NUJ. Part I discussed several 
characteristics of piracy that were either necessary or helpful to its universal 
status. Modern human rights offenses do not have many of these characteristics.
Piracy was not only committed exclusively by private actors, it was 
committed by private actors who had turned their backs on their home state and 
thus would not likely receive any protection from it. NUJ offenses on the other 
hand, are almost invariably committed by people acting under color of state law. 
From Sharon to Pinochet to Milosevic, the principal NUJ cases involve not just 
state actors, but the political or military leaders of nations. Quite unlike pirates, 
these are people that their home state would be expected to have great solicitude 
for, and thus resist assertions of UJ. Indeed, the home states of all those 
defendants did. Furthermore, pirates attacked ships of many nations, and by 
disrupting international commerce injured the economic interests of many more. 
Human rights offenses, on the other hand, are almost always committed against a 
single population, often within the offender’s own states. The crimes do not 
directly injure many nations,145 and it is thus unclear why the unaffected nations 
would have any interest in prosecution. Piracy was everywhere punished by 
death, and thus UJ did not create forum-shopping possibilities, double jeopardy 
145 See Part II.B.3, infra.
Page 66 of 67
problems, or set up potential conflicts between the laws of prosecuting states. Yet 
punishment for NUJ varies greatly; some nations punish human rights offenses 
with death, while others do not even have the death penalty. These differences in 
punishment have already caused serious problems for tribunals exercising NUJ.146
Finally, NUJ offenses appear to have much vaguer definitions than piracy.147
To be sure, NUJ offenses may have some of the relevant characteristics of 
piracy. All nations regarded piracy to be a crime, and morally culpable; the same 
can surely be said about genocide, war crimes and so forth. Moreover, some 
commentators have argued that NUJ offenses, like piracy, take place in situations 
where municipal enforcement is unlikely. Piracy occurred on the high seas, which 
was difficult to police because of its size;  NUJ offenses often take places in 
“failed states” where government has broken down, or are committed by the 
government itself against its own population; in either case, there is no “on the 
spot” enforcement mechanism.148 But on the whole, while NUJ claims 18th and 
19th century universal jurisdiction over piracy as a precedent and inspiration, it 
has chosen to disregard the safeguards and limitations that have traditionally kept 
UJ unproblematic and uncontroversial.
Part II has shown that rational, self-interested states would not exercise 
universal jurisdiction because of free rider and coordination problems. Enforcing 
universal norms amounts to providing a public good, and economically rational 
actors do not do this. Thus the few instances in which actual UJ can be observed 
146 See text accompanying notes 58-60, infra. 
147 See text accompanying notes 76-77, 79- 81, infra.
148 See Cowles, supra note 44, at 193-94.
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may be explained either as nations acting on altruistic preferences, or as products 
of hegemonic stability.149 If, as is likely, the latter is the primary explanation, this 
has rather grim implications for the success of NUJ. If there is a global hegemon 
today, it is the United States. Yet the U.S. is the nation most opposed to
expanding UJ beyond piracy to the NUJ human rights offenses. The American 
reluctance suggests that the benefits of NUJ are diffuse enough, or the costs of 
production high enough, that the latter would exceed the former despite the broad 
scale and scope of U.S. global interests.
While the rational choice model suggests nations would rarely if ever 
exercise UJ, the universal principle was for centuries said to apply to piracy. This 
Article has shown how UJ over piracy was a useful concept, and thus a long-lived 
and widely accepted one, despite the enforcement paradox. The rational choice 
model can be reconciled with the longstanding acceptance of UJ over piracy once 
if such “universal jurisdiction” was not really used to expand jurisdiction to 
offenses with which the forum state had no connection, but rather as an 
evidentiary rule to facilitate the proof of territorial and national jurisdiction. Many 
classic U.S. piracy cases that are often thought to stand for UJ only used the 
universal principal as an evidentiary rule; territorial or national jurisdiction 
probably existed in those cases. Yet NUJ does not use the universal principle as 
merely an evidentiary rule; NUJ seeks to apply it specifically in those cases where 
there is no nexus between the forum state and the crime. This represents an 
entirely different phenomenon from piracy universal jurisdiction.
149 See Part II.D.
